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At the foundations of probability theory lies a question that has been open since de Finetti
framed it in 1930: whether or not an uncertainty model should be required to be conglom-
erable. Conglomerability is related to accepting infinitely many conditional bets. Walley is
one of the authors who have argued in favor of conglomerability, while de Finetti rejected
the idea. In this paperwe study the extension of the conglomerability condition to two types
of uncertainty models that are more general than the ones envisaged by de Finetti: sets of
desirable gambles and coherent lower previsions.We focus in particular on theweakest (i.e.,
the least-committal) of those extensions, which we call the conglomerable natural extension.
The weakest extension that does not take conglomerability into account is simply called the
natural extension.We show that taking the natural extension of assessments after imposing
conglomerability—the procedure adopted inWalley’s theory—does not yield, in general, the
conglomerable natural extension (but it does so in the case of the marginal extension). Iter-
ating this process of imposing conglomerability and taking the natural extension produces
a sequence of models that approach the conglomerable natural extension, although it is not
known, at this point, whether this sequence converges to it. We give sufficient conditions
for this to happen in some special cases, and study the differences between working with
coherent sets of desirable gambles and coherent lower previsions. Our results indicate that
it is necessary to rethink the foundations ofWalley’s theory of coherent lower previsions for
infinite partitions of conditioning events.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Consider an experiment whose non-empty set of possible outcomes is the so-called possibility space . Suppose you are
offered a gamble f : a bounded real-valued function on . It represents an uncertain reward as it depends on the outcome
of the experiment. You find out that, whatever you might observe, as expressed by an event B in a certain partition B of ,
you would accept f conditional on B. Does this imply that you should unconditionally accept f ?
This question can be conveniently addressed using the notion of desirability, which leads to a very general way of dealing
with uncertainty. Common rationality axioms for desirability—these are also called coherence axioms—, such as those in
Walley [21, Section 3.7] or [23], imply that f should indeed be accepted, if B is finite. When B is infinite, some authors have
proposed to impose the above requirement through an additional axiom of so-called conglomerability. In fact, conglomer-
ability (suitably reformulated in a more recognisably probabilistic manner) is a foundational axiom for Walley’s theory of
coherent lower previsionswhen the conditioning partition is infinite.We recall here that a coherent lower prevision is a lower
envelope of linear previsions, each of which is the expectation functional associated with an additive probability.
The notion of conglomerability was originally introduced by de Finetti [4,6] as a property that a finitely additive—but
not countably additive—probability may or may not satisfy. In fact, de Finetti was also the first to reject the idea that
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conglomerability should be imposed. The concept was studied later by Dubins [9], who established a connection with the
notion of disintegrability. Conglomerability has also been studied by Seidenfeld, Schervisch andKadane in a number of papers
[16–18], and by Doria [8]. In particular, in [16] it is shown that countable additivity is necessary, but for a few pathological
cases, for full conglomerability, that is, for conglomerability with respect to all possible partitions of . 1
Imposingconglomerability, evenwith respect toonlya singlepartitionB, comesat theexpenseofmathematicalproperties
thatmight be consideredundesirable: for example, a conglomerable coherent lower previsionmaynot be the lower envelope
of conglomerable linear previsions. Perhaps also becauseof this, the ideaof conglomerabilitywas rejected in someextensions
of de Finetti’s work, like Williams’s [23] (see also [15]).
In this paper, we do not wish to take any philosophical position on whether it is reasonable to require conglomerability
with respect to a partition we envisage conditioning on. 2 But we do think that requiring full conglomerability, rather than
requiring conglomerability only for the partitions that are actually used for updating beliefs, is rather more questionable:
in specifying beliefs, it seems to be useful, and sometimes even essential, to envisage beforehand which partitions we will
want to condition on. Automatic conditioning can indeed lead to problems: see [19] for a clear exposition of this point of
view. This is also the approach taken by De Cooman and Hermans with their ‘cut conglomerability’ in [2]. Our aim here is to
perform amathematical study of the impact of conglomerability on the possible extensions of an initial set of desirability, or
probabilistic, assessments. The focus is, in particular, on what we call the conglomerable natural extension: loosely speaking,
this is the weakest (i.e., least-committal) conglomerable and coherent model that extends given assessments. A related
concept is the natural extension, which is defined as the weakest coherent extension, and where conglomerability is not
imposed.
We start in Section 2 by introducing some basic notions: desirability, along with its characterising axioms; coherent
lower previsions induced by a set of desirable gambles, and the set of desirable gambles induced by some coherent lower
previsions. Moreover, we introduce conglomerability in a few different forms: for desirable gambles, in the traditional form
and in a weaker variant; for coherent lower previsions, in the traditional way and in a strengthened form. We show how
these notions are related, which allows us to transform problems written for one type of model into the other.
In Section 3 we focus on desirability. We show that the conglomerable natural extension F , provided that it exists, of a
set R of desirable gambles with respect to a partition B, is the intersection of all conglomerable sets of desirable gambles
includingR. Moreover, we relate F to the natural extension: we start fromR, close it with respect to conglomerability, and
take its natural extension, obtaining E1; we iterate this process, yielding E2, . . . , En, . . . We show that En ⊆ F for all n, and
that the sequence stabilises (becomes constant) if and only if one if its elements coincides with F . We provide sufficient
conditions for this to happen, as well as a few examples to illustrate the situation. One of them, in particular, shows that
taking the closure with respect to conglomerability may extend a non-conglomerable set of desirable gambles beyond its
topological border.
In Section 4 we study the conglomerable natural extension F of a coherent lower prevision P with respect to a partition
B. Here, too, we consider a sequence: we start from P, compute its conditional natural extension E(·|B), and then the natural
extension of the two of them together, E1; we iterate the process, yielding E2, . . . , En, . . .. We show that En ≤ F for all n,
and again that the sequence stabilises if and only if one of its elements coincides with F . Then we provide what is arguably
the most important result of this paper: we show in Example 5 that E1 may not equal F . The importance of this example
stems from the fact that, when it comes to the natural extension (as well as to coherence),Walley’s theory is implicitly based
on stopping at the first element of the sequence: E1. We show that this is not enough to fully capture the implications of
conglomerability. This raises the need to rethink the foundations of Walley’s theory when a model is based on an infinite
conditioning partition. We also give sufficient conditions for E1 = F .
In Section 5 we relate the results obtained for sets of desirable gambles and coherent lower previsions: we start from a
set of desirable gambles R and deduce from this a coherent lower prevision P; we create the sequences of sets of desirable
gambles, on the one hand, and coherent lower previsions, on the other. We explore the relationship between the elements
of the sequences. This allows us, in Example 7, to exploit Example 5 and show that also E1 need not coincide with F: this
means that one-step conglomerability is not enough for sets of desirable gambles either. We give sufficient conditions for
E1 = F , as well as for the two sequences to be made out of equivalent models.
Section 6 deepens the connection between conglomerability and coherence. Coherence is arguably the most important
notion both for desirable gambles and lower previsions. Loosely speaking, a coherent model is one that is self-consistent.
We investigate to what extent the conglomerability of a set of gambles implies that it is coherent with the conditional set
of gambles it induces; moreover we show that any coherent pair of conditional and unconditional lower previsions can be
derived from a single conglomerable set of desirable gambles.
Finally, in Section 7 we focus on the problem where more than one partition is considered. We focus in particular
on the important case where information is represented in a hierarchical way through the marginal extension (see [21,
Theorem 6.7.2], [12]), which is a generalisation of the law of iterated expectation to sets of desirable gambles. We show that
in this case E1 = F: one-step conglomerability yields the conglomerable natural extension. We provide our concluding
views and some remarks in Section 8.
1 See also [10, Section 6 and Theorem A1] and [20, Example 3] for some interesting examples showing that countable additivity is not always sufficient for full
conglomerability, and Walley [21, Section 6.9] for a discussion of this matter within Walley’s theory.
2 This is also called partial conglomerability. In this paper by conglomerability we just mean partial conglomerability.
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2. Introduction to imprecise probabilities
2.1. Coherent lower previsions
Let us introduce the basics of the theory of coherent lower previsions that we use in this paper. We refer to Walley [21]
for an in-depth study, and to [11] for a survey.
Consider a possibility space . A gamble is a bounded map f :  → R. The set of all gambles is denoted by L(), or
simply by L when there is no ambiguity about the possibility space we are working with. In particular, we use f  0 to
denote a gamble f ≤ 0, f = 0 (and we will refer to this as a negative gamble), and f  0 to denote a gamble f ≥ 0, f = 0
(this will be called a positive gamble). We use the notation L+(), or simply L+, to refer to the set of positive gambles.
A lower prevision P is a real-valued functional defined on some set of gambles K ⊆ L. When the domain K of P is a
linear space—closed under point-wise addition and multiplication by real numbers—P is called coherent when it satisfies
the following conditions:
C1. P(f ) ≥ inf f for all gambles f ∈ K;
C2. P(λf ) = λP(f ) for all gambles f ∈ K and all positive real λ;
C3. P(f + g) ≥ P(f ) + P(g) for all gambles f , g ∈ K.
Given a partition B of , a conditional lower prevision on L is a functional P(·|B) := ∑B∈B BP(·|B) such that for every set
B ∈ B, P(·|B) is a lower prevision on L. Note the use, in this case, of B to denote the indicator function of event B ∈ B; we
shall use this notation repeatedly in the paper. P(·|B) is called separately coherent when P(·|B) is coherent and P(B|B) = 1
for every B ∈ B. For every gamble f , P(f |B) is a gamble on  that is constant on the elements of B; such gambles are called
B-measurable.
For every lower prevision P and every conditional lower prevision P(·|B), we use the notations:
GP(f ) := f − P(f ), GP(f |B) := B(f − P(f |B)), GP(f |B) := f − P(f |B) =
∑
B∈B
GP(f |B).
If we consider a coherent lower prevision P on L and a separately coherent conditional lower prevision P(·|B) on L, they are
called coherent 3 if and only if for every gamble f and every B ∈ B, P(GP(f |B)) ≥ 0 and
P(GP(f |B)) = 0. (GBR)
This second condition is called the Generalised Bayes Rule, and if P(B) > 0 it can be used to uniquely determine the value
P(f |B): in that case there is only one value satisfying (GBR) with respect to P. If P and P(·|B) satisfy (GBR), we also say that
they areWilliams coherent [23]. 4
One particular case of coherent P, P(·|B) are the vacuous unconditional and conditional lower previsions, given by
P(f ) = inf
ω∈ f (ω) and P(f |B) = infω∈B f (ω) for all f ∈ L and all B ∈ B.
A particular case of coherent lower previsions is that of linear previsions. A linear prevision is a functional P : L → R
satisfying conditions C1 and C2, and
P(f + g) = P(f ) + P(g) for all f , g ∈ L.
Its restriction to events is a finitely additive probability, and P the corresponding expectation operator. 5 The set of all linear
previsions is denoted by P. Given a coherent lower prevision P on K, we define its associated credal set as
M(P) := {P ∈ P : (∀f ∈ K)P(f ) ≥ P(f )} .
Using this set, we can define the natural extension of a coherent lower prevision P from its domain K to L: it is simply the
lower envelope ofM(P), and it corresponds to the smallest coherent lower prevision on L that dominates P on K.
Similarly, a conditional linear prevision is a functional P(·|B) on L such that P(B|B) = 1 and P(·|B) is a linear prevision for
every B ∈ B.
3 See [21, Section 6.3.2] for a definition of coherence on more general domains.
4 Williams coherence is not constrained to gambles whose conditioning events form a partition of the sure event; this is one of the reasons why it does not
necessarily satisfy conglomerability, as we shall see later on.
5 The expectation is obtained by taking the Dunford integral [1].
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2.2. Sets of desirable gambles
The above theory can be generalised using sets of desirable gambles. We consider a set of gambles Q whose desirability
we have evaluated, resulting in a subset R ⊆ Q of desirable gambles. For now, we are going to focus on the simplest case
where Q coincides with L.
LetR be a set of gambles. We consider the following rationality axioms for desirability:
D1. L+ ⊆ R.
D2. 0 /∈ R.
D3. f ∈ R, λ > 0 ⇒ λf ∈ R.
D4. f , g ∈ R ⇒ f + g ∈ R.
A set of desirable gambles satisfying these four axioms is called coherent relative to L, or simply coherent.
Given a set of desirable gamblesR, we define
posi(R) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
n∑
k=1
λkfk : fk ∈ R, λk > 0, n ≥ 1
⎫⎬
⎭ .
We call R a convex cone if it is closed under positive linear combinations, meaning that posi(R) = R. This is equivalent to
R satisfying conditions D3 and D4. The set posi(R∪L+) is called the natural extension ofR, and corresponds to its smallest
coherent superset—providedR is included in some coherent set.
Moreover, given a partition B of ,R is called B-conglomerablewhen it also satisfies the following axiom:
D5. f ∈ L ((∀B ∈ B)(Bf ∈ R ∪ {0})) ⇒ f ∈ R ∪ {0}.
This axiom D5 is a consequence of D4 when B is finite.
Similarly, we can define a notion of B-conglomerability for coherent lower previsions:
Definition 1. Let P be a coherent lower prevision onL, andB a partition of. P is calledB-conglomerablewhen the following
condition holds:
wBC. if f ∈ L and Bn, n ∈ N, are distinct sets inB such that P(Bn) > 0 and P(Bnf ) ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, then P(∑n∈N Bnf ) ≥ 0. 6
Again, wBC holds trivially when N is finite, and in particular when the partition B is finite, because of the super-additivity
C3 of coherent lower previsions.
Let us establish the relation between the different concepts for lower previsions and for sets of desirable gambles. In
order to do this, we introduce two additional concepts for sets of desirable gambles. A setR is called a coherent set of strictly
desirable gambleswhen it is coherent and moreover
(∀f ∈ R \ L+)(∃ε > 0) such that f − ε ∈ R,
and it is called a coherent set of almost-desirable gambleswhen it satisfies axioms D1, D3 and D4, as well as
D2’. sup f < 0 ⇒ f /∈ R;
and
D6. ((∀ε > 0)(f + ε ∈ R)) ⇒ f ∈ R.
A coherent set of almost-desirable gambles is not a coherent set of desirable gambles: axioms D1 and D6 imply that any set
of almost-desirable gambles includes the zero gamble, and as a consequence it violates D2.
Given a coherent lower prevision P, we define its associated set of strictly desirable gambles by
R := L+ ∪ {f ∈ L : P(f ) > 0} , (1)
and its associated coherent set of almost-desirable gambles by
R := {f ∈ L : P(f ) ≥ 0} . (2)
6 Here N is any index set, but because of the condition that P(Bn) > 0 for all n ∈ N, we can effectively restrict ourselves to countable N; however, this is not
the case with the notion of strong conglomerability to be introduced later on, and more generally the partition B is not necessarily countable.
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It is not difficult to show that R satisfies the axioms D1–D4 considered above, and that R is a cone that includes all non-
negative gambles. Moreover,R ⊆ R, andR contains all non-negative gambles and is closed under dominance.
Conversely, given a coherent set of gamblesR, we can define a lower prevision by
P(f ) := sup {μ : f − μ ∈ R} for all f ∈ L. (3)
It follows from Miranda and Zaffalon [14, Theorem 6] that P is a coherent lower prevision. 7 Moreover, if we consider the
setsR andR given by Eqs. (1) and (2), it follows fromWalley [21, Theorem 3.8.1] that
sup {μ : f − μ ∈ R} = P(f ) = sup {μ : f − μ ∈ R} . (4)
Hence, there is a one-to-one correspondence between coherent sets of strictly desirable gambles and coherent lower
previsions, and as a consequence also with closed and convex sets of linear previsions. 8
Any setR such thatR ⊆ R ⊆ R induces the same lower prevision P by means of (3) [21, Theorem 3.8.1]. If in particular
R is amaximal coherent set of desirable gambles, meaning that it satisfies D1–D4 and moreover
f /∈ R and f = 0 ⇒ −f ∈ R,
then the coherent lower prevision it induces via Eq. (3) is a linear prevision.
The setR is the closure ofR (and as a consequence also of anyR ⊆ R ⊆ R) in the topology of uniform convergence [14,
Proposition 4]:
R = {f ∈ L : (∀ε > 0)(f + ε ∈ R)} ,
and on the other hand:
R = L+ ∪ {f ∈ R : f − ε ∈ R for some ε > 0} ,
for anyR ⊆ R ⊆ R.
Hence, any coherent lower prevision is in correspondence with an infinite class of coherent sets of desirable gambles:
they are all the coherent R such that R ⊆ R ⊆ R. Similarly to Eq. (3), given a coherent set of gambles R and a partition B
of , we can induce a separately coherent conditional lower prevision P(·|B) on L by
P(f |B) := sup {μ : B(f − μ) ∈ R} for all f ∈ L, B ∈ B. (5)
2.3. The behavioural interpretation
The above concepts can be given a behavioural interpretation, in terms of buying and selling prices [7,21]. Given a gamble
f , its lower prevision P(f ) can be seen as a supremum desirable buying price for f , in the sense that for every μ < P(f ) the
transaction f − μ is desirable.
When this supremum acceptable buying price coincides with the infimum acceptable selling price for f , which is
inf {μ : μ − f ∈ R} = −P(−f ), this common value can be seen as a fair price for f , and if we can establish fair prices
for all gambles, we determine a linear prevision. A similar interpretation can be provided for the conditional lower previ-
sions: P(f |B) is the supremum price we would (currently) give for f , if we observed the event B.
The rationality of our buying and selling prices can be verified by means of axioms D1–D4: condition D1, for instance,
means that a transaction that can never make us lose utiles, and possibly make us gain some, should be desirable; D3means
that a change in the linear utility scale should not affect the set of gambles we consider desirable. All these axioms together
imply that by combining a finite number of acceptable transactions a Dutch book cannot be built against us, and moreover
that our supremum buying prices are the result of some thorough reflection, in the sense that one cannot force a change in
our prices by taking into account the implications of any finite number of our desirable gambles.
Now, the reason why conglomerability is controversial is because, unlike coherence, it involves the combination of an
infinite number of transactions: 9 it means that the infinite sum of desirable gambles that depend on different elements of
a partition should be desirable. This is called the conglomerative principle in Walley [21] and implies, for instance, that the
gamble GP(f |B) + ε should be desirable for all ε > 0. This is rejected by authors such as Williams, for whom the gamble
GP(f |B) is only almost-desirable when f has a finite support in B, i.e., when there is only a finite number of elements of B
on which f is non-zero.
7 This follows under general assumptions from [22, Proposition 1], where some slightly weaker desirability axioms are considered.
8 But the correspondence does not hold for open sets of previsions, in the sense that a gamble may be strictly desirable for all P in the interior ofM(P) but not
for P; interestingly, we do have a correspondence like this when we work with almost-desirable gambles.
9 But see also Zaffalon and Miranda [24] for a recent finitary interpretation.
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Walley’s position is to support conglomerability, and for this reason his definition of coherence for conditional and uncon-
ditional lower previsions is based on the conglomerative principle. On the other hand, for linear previsions, conglomerability
with respect to all partitions is very strongly related to countable additivity, and de Finetti and others have argued [4] that
in some cases countable additivity can give rise to unreasonable conclusions.
Wealsomentionhereapropertyof conglomerability thatmightbeundesirable toat least somepeople: it isnot compatible
with the sensitivity analysis interpretation, in the sense that a conglomerable set of gambles is notnecessarily the intersection
of conglomerablemaximal supersets (seeExample1 lateron), and related to this, that coherent conditional andunconditional
lower previsions are not necessarily the lower envelope of a set of coherent conditional and unconditional linear previsions
(see [21, Examples 6.6.9,6.6.10] for examples).
2.4. Connection between the conglomerability conditions
We establish a conglomerability condition for sets of desirable gambles that is equivalent to the conglomerability of the
associated lower prevision.
Definition 2. A set of desirable gamblesR is called weakly B-conglomerable if and only ifR is B-conglomerable.
For a set of strictly desirable gambles, conglomerability andweak conglomerability coincide. Let us now show that this weak
B-conglomerability is indeed weaker than B-conglomerability. In order to do so, we first establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on L, and consider B ⊆ . Then P(B) = 0 ⇒ (∀f ∈ L)P(Bf ) ≤ 0.
Proof. If sup f ≤ 0, then the coherence of P implies that P(Bf ) ≤ 0. On the other hand, if sup f > 0 then the monotonicity
of coherent lower previsions implies that P(Bf ) ≤ P(B sup f ) = P(B) sup f = 0. 
Theorem 2. LetR be a coherent set of desirable gambles. ThenR is weakly B-conglomerable if and only if
wD5 . f ∈ L ((∀B ∈ B)(Bf ∈ R ∪ {0})) ⇒ f ∈ R.
Proof. Since it is clear that condition D5 implies wD5when applied toR, it suffices to prove the converse. Assume that wD5
holds, and consider a non-zero gamble f such that Bf ∈ R ∪ {0} for every B ∈ B. We need to show that f ∈ R.
Let P be the coherent lower prevision induced by R. If f ∈ L+ then it follows immediately that f ∈ R; if f /∈ L+, then
there is some B ∈ B such that Bf  0. Since Bf ∈ R, it follows that P(Bf ) > 0, so there is some ε > 0 such that
P(B(f − ε)) ≥ P(Bf − ε) > 0.
Let g := f − Bε. Then for every B′ ∈ B it follows that B′g ∈ R ∪ {0}. Applying wD5, we deduce that g ∈ R, and therefore
P(g) ≥ 0. As a consequence,
P(f ) = P(g + Bε) ≥ P(g) + P(Bε) ≥ εP(B) > 0,
taking into account that P(B) > 0 because of Lemma 1. Hence P(f ) > 0 and therefore f ∈ R. We conclude that this set
satisfies D5. 
By comparing conditions D5 and wD5, we see that if a coherent set of gambles R is B-conglomerable, it is in particular
weakly B-conglomerable. WhenR is a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles, Theorem 2 implies that it is conglomerable
if and only if
f ∈ L ((∀B ∈ B)(Bf ∈ R ∪ {0})) ⇒ f ∈ R.
Next we show that the weak B-conglomerability of a coherent set of desirable gambles is equivalent to the
B-conglomerability of the coherent lower prevision it induces.
Theorem 3. LetR be a coherent set of desirable gambles, and let P be the coherent lower prevision it induces by means of Eq. (3).
Then P satisfies wBC if and only ifR is weakly B-conglomerable.
Proof. Let us show that P satisfies wBC if R satisfies wD5. Consider a gamble f such that P(Bnf ) ≥ 0 for some distinct sets
Bn ⊆ B, with P(Bn) > 0 for all n ∈ N. Then for anyfixed ε > 0 and any n ∈ N it holds that P(Bn(f +ε)) ≥ P(Bnf )+εP(Bn) >
0, whence Bn(f + ε) ∈ R. Applying wD5, we deduce that∑n Bn(f + ε) ∈ R for every ε > 0. Since this set is closed under
uniform convergence, we deduce that
∑
n Bnf ∈ R, and therefore P(∑n Bnf ) ≥ 0.
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Conversely, assume that P satisfies wBC, and that for some f ∈ L, Bf ∈ R∪ {0} for all B ∈ B. This implies that P(Bf ) ≥ 0
for all B ∈ B, using Eq. (2) and the inclusion R ∪ {0} ⊆ R. If P(B) = 0, then Lemma 1 implies that P(Bf ) ≤ 0, and as a
consequence P(Bf ) = 0. Taking into account Eq. (1), we deduce that if Bf ∈ R ∪ {0} then also Bf ≥ 0.
Let B′ := {B ∈ B : P(B) > 0}. If B′ is empty, then Bf ≥ 0 for all B ∈ B and hence f ∈ L+ ⊆ R. Let us consider the case
that B′ is not empty. By wBC, P(∑B∈B′ Bf ) ≥ 0. Thus,
P(f ) = P
⎛
⎝∑
B∈B′
Bf + ∑
B∈B\B′
Bf
⎞
⎠ ≥ P
⎛
⎝∑
B∈B′
Bf
⎞
⎠+ P
⎛
⎝ ∑
B∈B\B′
Bf
⎞
⎠ ≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from C3 and the second from C1. As a consequence P(f ) ≥ 0 and then Eq. (2) implies that
f ∈ R. 
This result, togetherwith Theorem2, implies that a coherent lower prevision P isB-conglomerable if and only if its associated
set of strictly desirable gambles is B-conglomerable.
On the other hand, when we consider a coherent set of almost-desirable gambles R, condition D5 is equivalent to
D5’. f ∈ L (∀B ∈ B)(Bf ∈ R)) ⇒ f ∈ R.
We next show that condition D5 can also be related to a notion of conglomerability for coherent lower previsions:
Definition 3. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on L, and B a partition of. P is called strongly B-conglomerablewhen the
following condition holds:
BC. ((∀B ∈ B)(P(Bf ) ≥ 0)) ⇒ P(f ) ≥ 0.
Theorem 4. Let P be a coherent lower prevision, and letR be its associated set of almost-desirable gambles, given by Eq. (2). Then
P is strongly B-conglomerable if and only if R satisfies D5. Conversely, a coherent set of almost-desirable gambles satisfies D5 if
and only if the coherent lower prevision P it induces satisfies BC.
Proof. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between coherent lower previsions and coherent sets of almost-desirable
gambles, it suffices to prove the first of the two equivalences. But this is immediate once we remark that a gamble g belongs
toR if and only if P(g) ≥ 0, and that in particular this holds for the gambles Bf , for all f ∈ L and B ∈ B. 
By comparing conditions BC and wBC, we see that if a coherent lower prevision is strongly B-conglomerable, then it is
also B-conglomerable.
Theorems 3 and 4 lead to one of the most important points we make in this paper: that the usual correspondence
between sets of desirable gambles and coherent lower previsions does not extend to conglomerability: the usual notion of
conglomerability for sets of desirable gambles, given by D5, is stronger (more restrictive) than the one for coherent lower
previsions, given in Definition 1. Nevertheless, we still maintain the one-to-one correspondence between coherent lower
previsions and sets of strictly desirable gambles when we add conglomerability, because for the latter the notions of weak
and strong conglomerability are equivalent.
3. Conglomerability for sets of desirable gambles
Let us consider a set of gambles R, and look for the smallest superset F (if it exists) that satisfies D1–D5 with respect
to a fixed partition B. We call this set the conglomerable natural extension of R. A first characterisation of this set is given in
the following proposition. We use the notation DC(B) for the set of all conglomerable coherent sets of desirable gambles—
satisfyingD1–D5—, andDwC(B) for the set of allweakly conglomerable coherent sets of desirable gambles—satisfyingD1–D4
and wD5—, on .
Proposition 5. If there is some coherent set of gambles that includesR and satisfies D5 (respectivelywD5) then the conglomerable
(respectively weakly conglomerable) natural extension ofR is given by:
F := ⋂ {D ∈ DC(B) : R ⊆ D} respectively F := ⋂ {D ∈ DwC(B) : R ⊆ D} .
Proof. It suffices to show that the setsDC(B) andDwC(B) are closed under arbitrary non-empty intersections. It was shown
elsewhere [3] that D1–D4 are preserved under taking such intersections. We now show that this also holds for D5 and wD5.
Consider an arbitrary non-empty familyRi, i ∈ I of sets of desirable gambles that satisfy D5. We show thatR := ⋂i∈I Ri
satisfies D5 too. Suppose that Bf ∈ R ∪ {0} for all B ∈ B, then also Bf ∈ Ri ∪ {0} for all B ∈ B and all i ∈ I, and therefore
f ∈ Ri ∪ {0} for all i ∈ I. Hence indeed f ∈ R ∪ {0}.
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Next, consider an arbitrary non-empty family Ri, i ∈ I of sets of desirable gambles that satisfy wD5. We show that
R := ⋂i∈I Ri satisfies wD5 too. Suppose that Bf ∈ R ∪ {0} for all B ∈ B; then for any B ∈ B either Bf ∈ L+ ∪ {0} (whence
Bf ∈ Ri ∪ {0} for all i ∈ I) or there is some ε > 0 such that Bf − ε ∈ R (whence Bf − ε ∈ Ri for all i ∈ I, and therefore
Bf ∈ Ri for all i ∈ I). Hence, also Bf ∈ Ri ∪ {0} for all B ∈ B and all i ∈ I, and therefore f ∈ Ri for all i ∈ I. This implies that
f + ε ∈ Ri for all i ∈ I and all ε > 0, and therefore f + ε ∈ R for all ε > 0. Hence indeed f ∈ R. 
From now on, we will assume that R satisfies conditions D1–D4, we denote this by writing R ∈ D. Condition D2
is necessary for the existence of a conglomerable natural extension, and properties D1, D3 and D4 can be satisfied by
considering the natural extension posi(R ∪ L+).
A coherent set of desirable gambles is always the intersection of all its maximal supersets [3]. However, this property
does not necessary keep on holding if we add the conglomerability requirement: the existence of a superset of R that
satisfies D1–D5 does not guarantee that there is a maximal superset of R that satisfies these axioms. Our example is just a
reformulation of Walley [21, Example 6.6.9]:
Example 1. Let be the set of integers without zero, and consider the partition B := {Bn : n ∈ N} given by Bn := {−n, n},
where N denotes the set of natural numbers without zero. Let P1 be a linear prevision on L satisfying P1({n}) = 1/2n+1 and
P1({−n}) = 0 for all n ∈ N and P1(I−N) = 1/2, where I denotes the indicator gamble. Consider also a linear prevision P2
satisfying P2({−n}) = 1/3n and P2({n}) = 0 for all n ∈ N, and P2(IN) = 1/2. Let P := min{P1, P2}.
Let R be the set of strictly-desirable gambles associated with P, given by Eq. (1). This set satisfies axioms D1–D4. To see
that it also satisfies D5, note that if a gamble 0 = f satisfies that Bnf belongs toR ∪ {0} for every n, then either P(Bnf ) > 0
or Bnf ≥ 0. But since P(Bnf ) > 0 implies that both P1(Bnf ) > 0 and P2(Bnf ) > 0, and this in turn means that f (−n) and
f (n) are non-negative, we also deduce that P(Bnf ) > 0 implies that Bnf  0. As a consequence, if Bnf ∈ R ∪ {0} for every
Bn ∈ B, then f ≥ 0, and since it is different from the zero gamble we deduce that f ∈ R.
Let us show now that there is no maximal superset of R satisfying wD5, and as a consequence neither D5. Assume
ex absurdo that D is such a set. Let P be its associated linear prevision, determined by Eq. (3). Since R ⊆ D, we deduce
that P dominates P. But Walley has shown in [21, Example 6.6.9] that no dominating linear prevision satisfies wBC. Using
Theorem 3, we deduce that D does not satisfy wD5, and as a consequence it does not satisfy D5 either.
Remark 1. Theorem 3 allows us to deduce that the conglomerable natural extension does not exist whenR induces a linear
prevision P, using Eq. (3), that is not conglomerable: if the conglomerable natural extension F did exist, then sinceR ⊆ F ,
the latter should induce a coherent lower prevision P that dominates P, and it is a consequence of C1 and C3 that this can
only happen when P = P.
Now, since F is conglomerable, it is also weakly conglomerable, and applying Theorem 3 we deduce that P is conglom-
erable, a contradiction.
On the other hand, ifR induces a conglomerable linear prevision P, the conglomerable natural extension ofRmay exist—
for instance ifR is the set of strictly desirable gambles associated to P then Theorem 3 implies thatR is conglomerable—or
it may not. To see an example of the latter case, consider for instance  := N, Bn := {2n, 2n − 1}, B := {Bn : n ∈ N} and a
linear prevision P satisfying
P({n}) = 0 for all n ∈ N and P({2n : n ∈ N}) = 1
2
.
Then P(Bn) = 0 for every n ∈ N, so P is trivially B-conglomerable. On the other hand, the set
R := {f : P(f ) > 0} ∪ {f : P(f ) = 0 and f (min {n : f (n) = 0}) > 0}
is a maximal set of gambles that lies between {f : P(f ) > 0} and {f : P(f ) ≥ 0}, so it induces the linear prevision P. To see
that it is not conglomerable, note that the gamble f := I{odd} − 2I{even} does not belong to R because P(f ) < 0 even if Bnf
belongs toR for all n. Since from its definition a maximal set has a conglomerable natural extension if and only if it is itself
conglomerable, we deduce that in this case the conglomerable natural extension F does not exist.
Our next goal is to find more practically constructive ways of expressing the (weakly) conglomerable natural extension
F . To get some intuition for how to proceed, look at the example of the natural extension of a (not necessarily coherent)
assessmentR: we first use the axiom D1 to turnR intoR ∪ L+, and then use the productive coherence axioms D3 and D4
successively to add gambles to this set. In this case, it so happens that after applying D3 and D4 only once, we arrive at
posi(R ∪ L+), which satisfies D1, D3 and D4. If this set of gambles satisfies D2, it is clearly the smallest coherent set to do
so; if it does not, thenR has no coherent extension.
This suggests that, in order to find the conglomerable natural extension F , we could use a similar procedure. We start
out with the coherent, but not necessarily conglomerable, set R, and we use the productive axiom D5 to add gambles to it,
making it conglomerable. The problem now is that, unlike D3 and D4 separately, D3–D4 and D5 do not play well together:
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the result of using D5 is a set of desirable gambles that is no longer necessarily coherent—it need not satisfy D4. Sowe use D3
and D4—or the posi operator—again, which now leads us to a set of desirable gambles that is no longer conglomerable, and
so on.
We are, in other words, led to define the following sequence of sets of desirable gambles:
RB := {0 = f ∈ L : (∀B ∈ B)Bf ∈ R ∪ {0}} (6)
E1 := posi(R ∪ RB)
...
EBn := {0 = f ∈ L : (∀B ∈ B)Bf ∈ En ∪ {0}} , n ≥ 1
En+1 := posi(En ∪ EBn ), n ≥ 1. (7)
In order to make the notation more uniform, we will sometimes use E0 := R and EB0 := RB .
Lemma 6. Let F ′ be a superset ofR that satisfies D1–D5. Then En ⊆ En+1 ⊆ F ′ for all n ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Proof. We proceed by induction on n. That En ⊆ En+1 follows trivially from the definition. If F ′ is a superset of R that
satisfies D1–D5, then it must include RB—because it satisfies D5—and therefore also E1—because it satisfies D3–D4. Now,
assume that En is included in F ′. Then condition D5 implies that also EBn ⊆ F ′, and then D3–D4 imply that En+1 is included
in F ′. 
It follows that the conglomerable natural extension of R, if it exists, must include the limit ⋃n En of the converging
sequence En. We next investigate which desirability axioms are satisfied by the En and EBn .
Proposition 7. LetR be a coherent set of desirable gambles, and assume that there is some superset F ′ ofR satisfying D1–D5.
(i) For every n ∈ N ∪ {0}, En satisfies D1–D4.
(ii) For every n ∈ N ∪ {0}, EBn satisfies D1–D5.
Proof. We begin with the first statement. Consider any n ∈ N ∪ {0}. It follows from the definition of En and EBn that
R := E0 ⊆ E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ . . . and thatRB := EB0 ⊆ EB1 ⊆ EB2 ⊆ . . .
Let us first prove that for every n ∈ N ∪ {0}, if En satisfies D3, respectively D4, then so does EBn :
D3: Consider f ∈ EBn and λ > 0. Then f = 0 and for every B ∈ B, Bf ∈ En ∪ {0}, so B(λf ) = λ(Bf ) ∈ En ∪ {0}, and
therefore λf ∈ EBn .
D4: Similarly, if f , g ∈ EBn , then for every B ∈ B, both Bf and Bg belong to En∪{0}, whence Bf +Bg = B(f +g) ∈ En∪{0},
and therefore f + g ∈ EBn : we also have that f + g = 0 because otherwise there would be some B ∈ B such that
0 = Bf ∈ En, Bg = −Bf ∈ En and this would mean that 0 ∈ En ⊆ F ′, a contradiction.
We proceed to show that En and EBn satisfy the different desirability axioms.
D1: Since L+ is included inR ⊆ En, it belongs to En, and consequently also to EBn , for any n ≥ 0.
D2: If there is some superset F ′ of R satisfying D1–D5, it follows from Lemma 6 that 0 /∈ En+1 = posi(En ∪ EBn ) for all
n ≥ 0, and consequently En and EBn satisfy D2.
On the other hand, it follows from Eq. (7) that En is a convex cone for all n ≥ 0, and therefore it satisfies D3 and D4.
Applying the first part of the proof, we deduce that so does EBn .
Finally, to see that EBn also satisfies D5, consider a non-zero gamble f such that Bf ∈ EBn ∪ {0} for all B ∈ B. This implies
that Bf ∈ En ∪ {0} for all B ∈ B, and as a consequence f ∈ EBn . 
It follows from this result that, when the conglomerable natural extension ofR exists, we can equivalently express En as
En =
{
μ1f1 + μ2f2 : f1 ∈ En−1, f2 ∈ EBn−1, μ1, μ2 ∈ {0, 1},max{μ1, μ2} = 1
}
and also
En =
{
f + g : f ∈ En−1 ∪ {0}, g ∈ EBn−1 ∪ {0}
}
\ {0}
for any n ≥ 1.
The intuition has been all along that when the sequence En breaks off (becomes constant) at some point, we have reached
the conglomerable natural extension F . Using Proposition 7, we can now confirm this.
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Proposition 8. The following conditions are equivalent for any n ∈ N ∪ {0}:
(i) EBn ⊆ En;
(ii) En satisfies D5;
(iii) F = En.
Proof. We give a circular proof.
If EBn is included in En, then given a non-zero gamble f such that Bf ∈ En ∪ {0} for all B ∈ B, it follows from the definition
of EBn that f ∈ EBn , and therefore f ∈ En. This implies that En satisfies D5.
Secondly, if En satisfies D5 then it follows from Proposition 7 that it is a superset of R that satisfies conditions D1–D5.
As a consequence, it must include the smallest such superset, and therefore F ⊆ En. The converse inclusion follows from
Lemma 6.
Finally, if F = En, we deduce that EBn ⊆ En from EBn ⊆ En+1 ⊆ F . 
This simple result has a couple of interesting consequences. On the one hand, if En is not the conglomerable natural extension
of R, then there must be some gamble f in EBn \ En, and as a consequence En is a proper subset of En+1. In other words, the
sequence En does not stabilise unless we get to the conglomerable natural extension. On the other hand, if EBn = EBn+1 for
some n then EBn+1 is included in En+1, and Proposition 8 implies that En+1 is the conglomerable natural extension ofR. This
means that the sequence EBn also stabilises when we get to the conglomerable natural extension, and only then: it is strictly
increasing before that.
We go a bit further and provide a sufficient condition for E1 to coincide with F:
Proposition 9. LetR be a coherent set of desirable gambles.
(i) RB satisfies D1–D5, even ifR has no conglomerable natural extension.
(ii) RB = F ⇔ R ⊆ RB ⇔ (∀B ∈ B)(f ∈ R ⇒ Bf ∈ R∪{0}). As a consequence, under any of these equivalent conditions,
E1 = RB = F .
(iii) If there is some superset Q ofR satisfying D1–D5 and such that QB = RB , then E1 = F .
Proof. The first statement is a consequence of Zaffalon and Miranda [24, Proposition 1].
To prove the second statement, observe that from the definition of RB , it includes R if and only if Bf ∈ R ∪ {0} for all
f ∈ R and B ∈ B. On the other hand, if R ⊆ RB , then we deduce that F ⊆ RB , since the first statement tells us that RB
satisfies D1–D5. HenceF = RB , and the converse implication is trivial. SinceRB ⊆ E1 ⊆ F , we deduce that ifR is included
inRB then E1 = F = RB .
For the last statement, note thatR ⊆ Q implies that E1 ⊆ Q1 = Q, where the last equality holds becauseQ satisfies D5,
and is therefore equal to its own conglomerable natural extension. As a consequence,we also have EB1 ⊆ QB = RB , and since
we always have the converse inclusion, we deduce that EB1 = RB . But then EB1 is included in E1, and applying Proposition 8
we deduce that E1 is the conglomerable natural extension ofR. 
We present an example showing that the inclusion R ⊆ RB does not imply that R = RB , or, equivalently, that we may
haveR  E1 = F:
Example 2. Consider  := N, Bn := {2n − 1, 2n} and B := {Bn : n ∈ N}. LetR be the set of gambles given by{
f : (∃n ∈ N)f I[n,∞) ∈ L+, (∀n ∈ N)(min{f (2n) + f (2n − 1), f (2n)} ≥ 0)
}
, (8)
where we use the notation ‘[n,∞)’ to denote the set {n, n+ 1, . . .} Then it is easy to see thatR satisfies D1–D4. To see that
R is included inRB , note that given a gamble f ∈ R and Bn ∈ B, Bn(f (2m) + f (2m − 1)) ≥ 0 and Bn(f (2m)) ≥ 0 for every
natural number m. Moreover, if Bnf = 0, then automatically Bnf ∈ R ∪ {0}. If Bnf = 0 then f (2n) > 0, whence Bnf ∈ R
because Bnf I[2n,∞) ∈ L+, or f (2n − 1) > 0 and whence Bnf ∈ R because Bnf I[2n−1,∞) ∈ L+.
However,R does not satisfy D5, and as a consequence it does not coincide withRB: the non-zero gamble g given by
g(2n) := 1 and g(2n − 1) := −1 for all n ∈ N (9)
does not belong toR because it does not become positive eventually: there is no natural number n such that gI[n,∞) ∈ L+.
On the other hand, for every natural number n, the non-zero gamble Bng does belong to R since BngI[2n,∞) ∈ L+, and
therefore g ∈ RB .
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This example allows us also to show that conglomerability and weak conglomerability of gambles are not equivalent:
Example 3. Let the coherent set R of desirable gambles be given by Eq. (8). We have already shown in Example 2 that it
does not satisfy D5. To see that it satisfies wD5, note that given a gamble f and Bn ∈ B, Bnf belongs toR ∪ {0} if and only if
Bnf ≥ 0, because there is no δ > 0 such that Bnf − δ ∈ R: Bnf − δ does not become positive eventually. As a consequence,
(∀Bn ∈ B)Bnf ∈ R ∪ {0} implies that f ≥ 0 and therefore f ∈ R.
The same example shows us something else that is quite interesting: it may happen that every Bnf lies in the ‘boundary’
R \ R (as well as every Bn) and at the same time f = ∑n Bnf lies outsideR:
Example 4. Let R by given by Eq. (8) and let g be the gamble defined in Eq. (9). Taking into account the comments in
Example 3, there is no δ > 0 such that Bng − δ ∈ R, because this gamble does not become positive eventually. On the other
hand, we know that Bng ∈ R. This means that Bng ∈ R \ R ⊆ R \ R for all Bn ∈ B.
Now, to show that g /∈ R, we consider any 0 < δ < 1 and show that g+δ does not belong toR. In fact, g(2n−1)+δ < 0
for all n ≥ 1, so g cannot become positive eventually.
Observe thatg+1 ∈ L+, sog+1 ∈ R. Thismeans that for theassociated lowerprevision:P(g) = sup {μ : g − μ ∈ R} =
sup {μ : g − μ ∈ R} = −1.
Stated differently, this means that even if the gambles that violate D5 are only on the border of R, taking the closure of
R with respect to D5 may not only affect the border (or the interior) of R, but may require to enlarge the set beyond its
borders.
On the other hand, when R is a set of strictly desirable gambles, the inclusion R ⊆ RB only holds in trivial cases, as we
see from the following proposition:
Proposition 10. Let P be a coherent lower prevision and letR be its associated set of strictly desirable gambles. ThenR ⊆ RB if
and only ifR = RB = L+.
Proof. The ‘if’ part is trivial, so we concentrate on the other implication. From Proposition 9, the inclusion R ⊆ RB is
equivalent to
f ∈ R and B ∈ B ⇒ Bf ∈ R ∪ {0}. (10)
Assume for the lower prevision P associated with R that there is some B0 ∈ B such that 0 < P(B0) ≤ 1. Then it follows
from Eq. (4) that there is some μ > 0 such that the gamble B0 − μ belongs to R. But this gamble is equal to −μ < 0 on
every B = B0, a contradiction with (10).
As a consequence, P(B) = 0 for all B ∈ B. Consider any f ∈ R then Lemma 1 tells us that P(Bf ) ≤ 0, so we infer from
Eq. (10) that Bf ∈ L+ ∪ {0} for all B ∈ B, so f ∈ L+. HenceR = L+, and then we deduce from Eq. (6) thatRB = L+. 
4. Conglomerability for coherent lower previsions
We investigate, for lower previsions, the relationship between the natural extension and the conglomerable natural
extension. To this end, we consider a coherent lower prevision P on K that is not B-conglomerable, and denote by F its
B-conglomerable natural extension.
Definition 4. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on K. Its conglomerable natural extension is the smallest coherent lower
prevision F on L that dominates P and is conglomerable.
Theremaynot be anydominating conglomerable coherent lowerprevision, and then the conglomerable natural extension
will not exist. On the other hand, if there is a dominating conglomerable model then there is a conglomerable natural
extension, because conglomerability is preserved by taking lower envelopes.
We can assumewithout loss of generality that the domain of P is the setL of all gambles: otherwise, it suffices to consider
the natural extension E of P to L. To see that the conglomerable natural extensions of P and E coincide, denote them by F1
and F2, respectively. Trivially F2 ≥ F1. Conversely, F1 is by definition a (B-conglomerable) coherent lower prevision that
dominates P on K, and which as a consequence dominates also the natural extension E—which is the smallest dominating
coherent lower prevision. Hence F1 ≥ F2, and therefore they are equal.
Given a coherent lower prevision P, Walley defines its conditional natural extension as:
P(f |B) :=
{
sup {μ : P(B(f − μ)) ≥ 0} if P(B) > 0
infω∈B f (ω) otherwise
(11)
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for every f ∈ L and B ∈ B. When P(B) > 0, P(f |B) corresponds to the unique value μ such that P(B(f − μ)) = 0, i.e., for
which (GBR) is satisfied. A consequence of this is that if we consider two coherent lower previsions P1 and P2, and their
conditional natural extensions P1(·|B) and P2(·|B) given by Eq. (11), then
P1 ≥ P2 ⇒ P1(·|B) ≥ P2(·|B). (12)
It turns out that this conditional natural extension can be used to characterise the conglomerability of P.
Proposition 11 ([21, Theorem 6.8.2]). Let P be a coherent lower prevision on L. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) P is B-conglomerable.
(ii) P is coherent with some conditional lower prevision P′(·|B).
(iii) P is coherent with its conditional natural extension P(·|B).
In [21, Section 6.6], Walley gives a number of examples of coherent lower previsions that are not B-conglomerable. We
next give a sufficient condition for conglomerability:
Proposition 12. If the conditional natural extension P(·|B) of P is vacuous, then P is B-conglomerable, and so is any coherent
lower prevision Q ≤ P.
Proof. From the definition of the conditional natural extension, P(GP(f |B)) = 0 for every gamble f and every set B ∈ B. On
the other hand, if P(·|B) is vacuous then it follows from the coherence of P that P(GP(f |B)) ≥ 0, because GP(f |B) is then
non-negative. Hence the discussion in Section 2.1 tells us that P and P(·|B) are coherent, and applying Proposition 11, we
deduce that P is conglomerable.
On the other hand, given Q ≤ P, it follows from Eq. (12) that the conditional lower prevision Q(·|B) derived from Q
using natural extension must be dominated by P(·|B), and applying separate coherence we deduce that Q(·|B) = P(·|B),
because P(·|B) is vacuous. Applying the first part, we deduce that Q and Q(·|B) are coherent, and therefore Q is also
B-conglomerable. 
If P is not B-conglomerable, it is not coherent with its conditional natural extension P(·|B). We will use this fact to
kickstart a procedure that generates a sequence of coherent lower previsions En that will get closer to the conglomerable
natural extension F , similarly to what we have done in the treatment of conglomerability for sets of desirable gambles in
the previous section.
Consider, in this case, the natural extensions E and E(·|B) of P and P(·|B), determined by [21, Theorem 8.1.5]:
E(f ) := sup {μ : f − μ ≥ GP(g) + GP(h|B) for some g, h ∈ L} , (13)
and
E(f |B) :=
{
sup {μ : E(B(f − μ)) ≥ 0} if E(B) > 0
sup
{
μ : B(f − μ) ≥ GP(g|B) for some g ∈ L} otherwise.
The conditional lower prevision E(·|B) coincides with the conditional natural extension of E, i.e., it can be obtained using
Eq. (11). To see this, note that if E(B) = 0 then also P(B) = 0. Applying Eq. (11), we deduce that GP(g|B) ≥ 0 for every
gamble g and therefore
sup
{
μ : B(f − μ) ≥ GP(g|B) for some g ∈ L} = sup {μ : B(f − μ) ≥ 0} = inf
ω∈B f (ω).
Since E ≥ P, we deduce from Eq. (12) that E(·|B) ≥ P(·|B).
Proposition 13. The natural extension E of P and P(·|B) is dominated by the conglomerable natural extension F of P, if it exists.
They coincide if and only if E and E(·|B) are coherent. Moreover,
M(E) = {P ∈ M(P) : (∀f ∈ L)P(GP(f |B)) ≥ 0} . (14)
Proof. From Walley [21, Theorem. 8.1.2(c)], E and E(·|B) are respective lower bounds for any coherent pairs of lower and
conditional lower previsions that dominate P and P(·|B), respectively.
Given the conglomerable natural extension F ≥ P and the conditional lower prevision F(·|B) it defines by conditional
natural extension—coherent with it—, we see that F(·|B) ≥ P(·|B): it suffices to take into account that F ≥ P and apply
Eq. (12). As a consequence, F ≥ E and F(·|B) ≥ E(·|B). Now, E = F if and only if E is B-conglomerable, and by Proposition 11
this is equivalent to E and E(·|B) being coherent.
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We conclude by proving Eq. (14). For the direct inclusion, consider any E ∈ M(E). It follows from the definition of E
that E ≥ E ≥ P, so E ∈ M(P). Moreover, E(GP(f |B)) ≥ E(GP(f |B)) ≥ 0 for every gamble f , where the last inequality
follows from Eq. (13). Conversely, consider any linear prevision P belonging to the set in the right-hand side of Eq. (14).
If there were some gamble g such that P(g) < E(g), then there would be some ε > 0 and gambles f and h such that
g − P(g) − ε ≥ GP(f ) + GP(h|B), whence P(g − P(g) − ε) = −ε ≥ P(GP(f ) + GP(h|B)) ≥ 0, a contradiction. 
The fact that the natural extensions E and E(·|B) need not be coherent, and that consequently, the natural extension E need
not coincide with the conglomerable natural extension F , is an indication that, although Walley’s treatment of coherence
and natural extension is intended to adequately deal with conglomerability, it falls somewhat short of this aim.
We next provide another interesting characterisation of E, by means of the so-called marginal extension:
Proposition 14. Consider any coherent lower prevision P and any separately coherent conditional lower prevision P(·|B) on L.
Define the marginal extension M := P(P(·|B)) of P and P(·|B), and let E be the natural extension of P and P(·|B). Then
M(E) = M(P) ∩M(M). (15)
As a consequence, if M ≥ P, then M coincides with E, and then M is the conglomerable natural extension of P.
Proof. We begin with the direct inclusion in Eq. (15). Consider any linear prevision P ∈ M(E). Since E ≥ P, P ∈ M(P).
From Eq. (14), it satisfies P(GP(f |B)) ≥ 0 for every gamble f . Since P is additive, we deduce that
P(f ) = P(GP(f |B)) + P(P(f |B)) ≥ P(P(f |B)) ≥ P(P(f |B)) = M(f )
for every gamble f . Hence P ∈ M(M).
Conversely, consider any linear prevision in M(P) ∩ M(M). Then for every gamble f it holds that P(GP(f |B)) ≥
M(GP(f |B)) ≥ 0, where the last inequality holds because M is the marginal extension of P(·|B) and the restriction of P
to the set of B-measurable gambles, which byWalley [21, Theorem 6.7.2] is coherent with P(·|B). Using Eq. (14), we deduce
that P ∈ M(E).
We turn to the second statement. If M dominates P, thenM(M) ⊆ M(E) and thereforeM(E) = M(M) by Eq. (15).
Hence E = M, or equivalently, E is the marginal extensionM of the restriction of P to the set of B-measurable gambles with
P(·|B). Since M is coherent with P(·|B), it is a B-conglomerable model by Proposition 11, and therefore it must dominate
the conglomerable natural extension F of P: M ≥ F . But since we also have M = E ≤ F by Proposition 13, we deduce that
M = F . 
Let us give an example showing that E does not coincide with the conglomerable natural extension in general:
Example 5. Let us consider := N∪−N, where as beforeN is the set of natural numbers without zero, Bn := {−n, n} and
B the partition of  given by B := {Bn : n ∈ N}. Let P be any finitely additive probability on P(N) that satisfies P({n}) = 0
for every n, and let us consider the linear previsions P1, . . . , P4, where P1 is determined by (the expectation associatedwith)
the σ -additive probability measure with mass function:
P1({n}) := P1({−n}) := 1
2n+1
, n ∈ N
and P2, . . . , P4 are given by, for any h ∈ L():
P2(h) := 1
2
∑
n∈N
h(n)
1
2n
+ 1
2
P(h2),
and
P3(h) := 3
4
P(h1) + 1
4
P(h2), and P4(h) := 1
2
P1(h) + 1
2
P3(h),
where the gambles h1 and h2 on N are defined by h1(n) := h(n) and h2(n) := h(−n) for all n ∈ N.
Consider the coherent lower prevision P := min{P1, P2, P4}. For every Bn ∈ B,
P(Bn) = min
{
1
2n
,
1
2n+1
,
1
2n+1
}
> 0.
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As a consequence, for every gamble h ∈ L(), Theorem 6.4.2 in Walley [21] guarantees that
P(h|Bn) = min{P1(h|Bn), P2(h|Bn), P4(h|Bn)} = min
{
h(n) + h(−n)
2
, h(n)
}
. (16)
To see that P is not B-conglomerable, consider the gamble f given by
f (n) := 1 − 1
n
and f (−n) := −f (n) = 1
n
− 1, n ∈ N.
It follows from Eq. (16) that P(f |Bn) = 0 for every n ∈ N, so GP(f |B) = f . Now
−1 = inf f2 ≤ P(f2) ≤ P
(
I[n,∞)
(
1
n
− 1
))
=
(
1
n
− 1
)
P([n,∞]) = 1
n
− 1 (17)
for all n ∈ N, where the last equality holds because P({1, . . . , n}) = 0 for all n ∈ N. Hence P(f2) = −1 and therefore
P(GP(f |B)) = P(f ) ≤ P2(f ) =
∑
n∈N
1
2n+1
(
1 − 1
n
)
− 1
2
< 0.
This implies that P is not coherent with the conditional P(·|B), and therefore, indeed, P is not B-conglomerable by Proposi-
tion 11.
Thismakesus lookat thenatural extensionE ofP andP(·|B), sowearegoing toapplyEq. (14) todetermineM(E). First of all,
for every linear previsionQ ∈ M(P), there areα1, α2, α4 ∈ [0, 1] such thatα1+α2+α4 = 1 andQ = α1P1+α2P2+α4P4.
We need to check which of these convex combinations satisfies Q(GP(h|B)) ≥ 0 for all gambles h, and therefore belongs
toM(E). It is easy to infer from Eq. (16) that for all n ∈ N:
GP(h|B)(n) = max
{
0,
h(n) − h(−n)
2
}
and
GP(h|B)(−n) = max
{
h(−n) − h(n), h(−n) − h(n)
2
}
.
As a consequence, GP(h|Bn) ≥ 0 as soon as h(n) ≤ h(−n), and this implies that GP(h|B) ≥ GP(h|B)IC , where C :=⋃ {Bn : h(n) ≥ h(−n)}. We can therefore concentrate on the worst-case gambles h such that h(n) ≥ h(−n) for every
n ∈ N. Let g := GP(h|B), then g1 ≥ 0 and g2 = −g1, and as a consequence,
Q(g) = α1P1(g) + α2P2(g) + α4P4(g) = 0 + α2
(
P1(gIN) + 1
2
P(g2)
)
+ α4
(
0 + 3
8
P(g1) + 1
8
P(g2)
)
= α2P1(gIN) + P(g1)1
4
(α4 − 2α2).
If α4 ≥ 2α2, we deduce from the non-negativity of g1, and the non-negativity of g on N, that Q(g) ≥ 0 and therefore
Q ∈ M(E). On the other hand, if α4 < 2α2 (and therefore α2 > 0) there is some natural number m such that α2/2m <
(2α2 − α4)/4. We consider the gamble hm given by
hm(n) := I[m,∞)(n) =
{
0 if n < m
1 if n ≥ m and hm(−n) := −hm(n) for all n ∈ N.
Then gm := GP(hm|B) = hm, P1(gmIN) = P1([m,∞)) = 1/2m and P((gm)1) = 1, using a course of reasoning similar to the
one leading to Eq. (17). As a consequence,
Q(gm) = α2P1(gmIN) + 1
4
P((gm)1)(α4 − 2α2) = 1
2m
α2 + 1
4
(α4 − 2α2) < 0,
and therefore Q /∈ M(E).
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We conclude that E is the lower envelope of the set {P1, P4, 1/3P2 + 2/3P4}, and as a consequence its conditional natural
extension E(·|B) is given by [again, see Theorem 6.4.2 in [21]]:
E(h|Bn) = min
{
h(n) + h(−n)
2
,
2h(n) + h(−n)
3
}
for all gambles h on . (18)
To see that E is notB-conglomerable, we use Proposition 11 and show that it is not coherentwith E(·|B). Consider any gamble
h such that h(n) ≤ h(−n) for all n ∈ N. Then Eq. (18) yields E(h|Bn) = (2h(n) + h(−n))/3, and consequently
GE(h|Bn)(n) = 1
3
[h(n) − h(−n)] and GE(h|Bn)(−n) = −2
3
[h(n) − h(−n)].
So, if we let g := GE(h|B), then we obtain g2 = −2g1 ≥ 0, whence
P4(g) = 1
2
P1(g) + 3
8
P(g1) + 1
8
P(g2) = 1
2
[P1(gIN) + P1(gI−N)] + 1
8
P(g1) = −1
8
[4P1(gIN) − P(g1)].
Let h(n) = h(−n) := 0 for n = 1, 2 and h(n) = −h(−n) := −1 for n > 2. Then P1(gIN) = −1/12 and P(g1) = −2/3, and
therefore P(g1) < 4P1(gIN), sowe get P4(GE(h|B)) < 0,whence E(GE(h|B)) < 0. This shows that E is notB-conglomerable,
and as a consequence it does not coincide with the conglomerable natural extension F of P, which exists because P1 ≥ P is
B-conglomerable (because any σ -additive model is, see Theorem 6.9.1 in [21]).
On the other hand, we can give a number of sufficient conditions for the natural extension to be B-conglomerable.
Proposition 15. Consider a coherent lower prevision P that has a conglomerable natural extension F. If there is some coherent
lower prevision Q ≥ P that is coherent with the conditional natural extension P(·|B) of P, then the natural extension E of P and
P(·|B) coincides with the conglomerable natural extension F. As a consequence, if the conditional natural extension P(·|B) of P is
linear, then the conglomerable natural extension F coincides with the natural extension E of P and P(·|B).
Proof. Assume that there is some Q ≥ P such that Q and P(·|B) are coherent. Then since E(·|B) ≥ P(·|B) and the pair E
and E(·|B) constitute a lower bound for any pair of coherent lower and conditional lower previsions that dominate P and
P(·|B), we deduce that P(·|B) = E(·|B) and E ≤ Q . To see that E and P(·|B) are coherent, note on the one hand that, by
Eq. (14), E(GP(f |B)) ≥ 0 for any gamble f , and in particular E(GP(f |B)) ≥ 0. On the other hand,
0 ≤ E(GP(f |B)) ≤ Q(GP(f |B)) = 0,
where the last inequality follows from the coherence of Q and P(·|B). It follows that E and P(·|B) are coherent, so E is
B-conglomerable by Proposition 11, and as a consequence it is the B-conglomerable natural extension F of P.
Let us prove now the second statement. From Eq. (12), F(·|B) ≥ P(·|B). Since this second functional is linear, it follows
from separate coherence that F(·|B) = P(·|B): if otherwise F(f |B) > P(f |B) for some gamble f and some B ∈ B, then
F(0|B) = F(f − f |B) ≥ F(f |B) + F(−f |B) > P(f |B) + P(−f |B) = 0,
a contradiction. Hence F and P(·|B) are coherent. Applying the first statement, we deduce that F coincides with the natural
extension E of P and P(·|B). 
We can now continue with our procedure to generate a sequence of coherent lower previsions En that will get closer
to the conglomerable natural extension F , similarly to what we have done in the treatment of conglomerability for sets of
desirable gambles in the previous section. When P is not B-conglomerable, we can consider the natural extension E1 := E
of P and P(·|B). If E1 is not B-conglomerable, we can consider the natural extension E2 of E1 and its conditional natural
extension E1(·|B), and so on. Our next result shows that the resulting sequence En of coherent lower previsions does not
stabilise (become constant) unless we get to a B-conglomerable coherent lower prevision:
Proposition 16. If a coherent lower prevision P is not B-conglomerable, then it does not coincide with the natural extension E of
P and P(·|B). On the other hand, if E(·|B) = P(·|B) then E is B-conglomerable.
Proof. If P is not B-conglomerable, this means that it is not coherent with its conditional natural extension P(·|B). Since P
and P(·|B) satisfy (GBR), this means that there is some gamble f such that P(GP(f |B)) < 0. On the other hand, the natural
extension E of P and P(·|B) satisfies E(GP(f |B)) ≥ 0 because of Eq. (14), and as a consequence it cannot coincide with P.
On the other hand, if E(·|B) = P(·|B), then since E(GP(f |B)) ≥ 0 for all f because of the definition of E, we conclude that
E is coherent with E(·|B), and as a consequence it is B-conglomerable. 
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We can establish Proposition 12 as a consequence of this result: if P(·|B) is vacuous, we deduce that P coincides with the
natural extension E of P and P(·|B), and as a consequence it must be B-conglomerable. We can also deduce the second state-
ment of Proposition 15: if P(·|B) is linear then it necessarily coincideswith E(·|B), and thismeans that E is the conglomerable
natural extension.
The sequence En is non-decreasing and dominated by the supremum operator, and it therefore converges point-wise to a
coherent lower prevision E∞, which by construction is dominated by the conglomerable natural extension F of P: it suffices
to use induction and to take into account that at any step n, En+1 is a lower bound of any coherent extension of En and En(·|B),
and therefore it is bounded by the conglomerable natural extension F . It is an open problemwhether the two coherent lower
previsions E∞ and F coincide, or to find an examplewhere En does not coincidewith F∞ for any n ∈ N, i.e., wherewe cannot
get to the conglomerable natural extension in a finite number of steps. Butwe can establish the following convergence result
for the conditional natural extension E∞(·|B) of E∞:
Proposition 17. For every gamble f , E∞(f |B) = limn→∞ En(f |B).
Proof. Since En is an non-decreasing sequence of coherent lower previsions that converges towards E∞, it follows from the
definition of the conditional natural extension that for every gamble f the sequence En(f |B) is a bounded andnon-decreasing
sequence of gambles whose limit is dominated by E∞(f |B). To see that there is equality, consider an arbitrary set B ∈ B. If
E∞(B) = 0 then E∞(f |B) = infω∈B f (ω) = En(f |B) for all n. If E∞(B) > 0, then there is some natural numberm such that
En(B) > 0 for all n ≥ m, taking into account that E∞(B) = limn→∞ En(B). As a consequence, taking into account that due
to (separate) coherence E∞(B(f − μ)) and En(B(f − μ)) are continuous and non-increasing functions of μ:
E∞(f |B) = sup
{
μ : E∞(B(f − μ)) ≥ 0
} = sup {μ : E∞(B(f − μ)) > 0}
= sup {μ : En(B(f − μ)) > 0 for some n ∈ N}
= sup
n∈N
sup
{
μ : En(B(f − μ)) > 0
} = sup
n∈N
sup
{
μ : En(B(f − μ)) ≥ 0
}
= sup
n∈N
En(f |B) = limn→∞ En(f |B). 
E∞ coincides with the conglomerable natural extension F if and only if E∞ is B-conglomerable, and this is equivalent to
E∞(GE∞(f |B)) ≥ 0 for every gamble f . This holds for instance if E∞(·|B) is the uniform limit of the sequence En(·|B): it
then follows from the coherence of E∞ (e.g., see [21, Section 2.6.1(	)]) that
E∞(GE∞(f |B)) = limn→∞ E∞(GEn(f |B)) ≥ limn→∞ En(GEn(f |B)) ≥ 0,
using Eq. (14) for the last inequality. But we stress that this uniform convergence is a very strong requirement: assume for
instance that we have a countable partition B = {Bn : n ∈ N}. If the following property holds
(∀n ∈ N, ε > 0)(∃fn,ε ∈ L)(sup(|fn,ε|) ≤ 1, E∞(fn,ε|Bn) − En(fn,ε|Bn) > ε),
then the convergence is not uniform: consider, for instance, for any given ε, the gamble fε := ∑n∈N Bnfn,ε .
5. Connection between the two approaches
In spite of the connection between sets of desirable gambles and coherent lower previsions we have summarised in
Section 2.2, the correspondence does not extend towards the notion of conglomerable natural extension we have discussed
in Sections 3 and 4. The reason is that in our definition of the conglomerable natural extension of a set of gambles we are
using condition D5, while the conglomerable natural extension for coherent lower previsions is based on condition wBC
which is equivalent to wD5, and which is therefore weaker than D5 in general. In this section, we explore the connection in
detail.
LetR be a set of desirable gambles satisfying D1–D4, and let P be its associated coherent lower prevision, given by Eq. (3).
If R does not satisfy D5, then we can consider the increasing sequence of sets of desirable gambles En, defined by means
of Eqs. (7). With each of these sets of desirable gambles we can associate a coherent lower prevision Pn, again by means
of Eq. (3). At the same time, we can consider the sequence En of coherent lower previsions derived from P in the manner
discussed in Section 4: E1 is the natural extension of P and P(·|B), where P(·|B) is the conditional natural extension of P; E2
is the natural extension of E1 and E1(·|B); and so on.
Let us investigate the relationship between the sequences Pn and En:
Proposition 18. For every gamble f , En(f ) ≤ Pn(f ).
Proof. We use induction on n.
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We begin with n = 1. Consider any gamble f ∈ L and μ < E1(f ). Then there are gambles g, h such that
f − μ ≥ GP(g) + GP(h|B).
As a consequence, given ε > 0,
f − μ + ε ≥ GP(g) + ε
2
+ GP(h|B) + ε
2
.
Since R is a coherent set of desirable gambles and P is derived from R using Eq. (3), we deduce that GP(g) + ε/2 =
g − (P(g) − ε/2) belongs toR. Similarly, for every B ∈ B the gamble GP(h|B) + Bε/2 also belongs toR: if P(B) = 0 this is a
positive gamble, which belongs toR because this set satisfies D1; and if P(B) > 0 then
P(h|B) = sup {μ : P(B(h − μ)) ≥ 0} = sup {μ : P(B(h − μ)) > 0} = sup {μ : B(h − μ) ∈ R} ,
so indeed GP(h|B) + Bε/2 ∈ R. As a consequence, GP(h|B) + ε/2 ∈ RB , and therefore f − μ + ε ∈ E1. This implies
that P1(f ) ≥ μ − ε, and since we can arrive at this conclusion for every μ < E1(f ) and every ε > 0, we conclude that
P1(f ) ≥ E1(f ).
Assume now that the result holds for n − 1, and let us show that it also holds for n. From the induction hypothesis, it
follows that En−1 ≤ Pn−1, and applying Eq. (12) we find that En−1(·|B) ≤ Pn−1(·|B).
Using the same reasoning as in the case n = 1, Pn dominates the natural extension Qn of Pn−1 and Pn−1(·|B). Since
Pn−1 ≥ En−1 and Pn−1(·|B) ≥ En−1(·|B), we deduce that Qn in turn dominates the natural extension En of En−1 and
En−1(·|B). Hence En ≤ Qn ≤ Pn. 
However, the coherent lower previsions Pn and En do not coincide in general, as the following counterexample shows:
Example 6. Consider the set of desirable gamblesR fromExample 2, and let P be its associated coherent lower prevision.We
have shown in Example 3 thatR satisfies wD5, and therefore Theorem 3 implies that P is B-conglomerable, and in particular
E1(f ) = P(f ) for every f . On the other hand, we have seen in Example 2 thatR does not satisfy D5, and in particular that the
gamble g := I{even}−I{odd} belongs toRB\R.Moreover,wehave seen inExample4 thatP(g) = sup {μ : g − μ ∈ R} = −1.
From all this, we deduce that P1(g) ≥ 0 > −1 = P(f ) = E1(f ), showing that P1 = E1: the inequality can be strict.
The reason for this can be found in the following characterisation of Pn:
Proposition 19. Pn is the natural extension of Pn−1 and P′n−1(·|B), where the conditional lower prevision P′n−1(·|B) is derived
from the set of desirable gambles En−1 by Eq. (5).
Proof. For every gamble f ,
Pn(f ) = sup {μ : f − μ ∈ En} = sup
{
μ : f − μ = μ1g + μ2h, g ∈ En−1, h ∈ EBn−1, μk ∈ {0, 1},max
k
μk = 1
}
.
Considerμ < Pn(f ). Then thereareμk ∈ {0, 1} such thatmaxk μk = 1,g ∈ En−1 andh ∈ EBn−1 such that f−μ = μ1g+μ2h.
g ∈ En−1 implies Pn−1(g) ≥ 0, so g ≥ GPn−1(g). h ∈ EBn−1 implies that Bh ∈ En−1 ∪ {0} for every B ∈ B, whence
P′n−1(h|B) ≥ 0. As a consequence
f − μ ≥ GPn−1(μ1g) + GP′n−1(μ2h|B). (19)
This means that the natural extension E′n of Pn−1 and P′n−1(·|B) satisfies E′n(f ) ≥ μ, and as a consequence E′n(f ) ≥ Pn(f ).
Conversely, letμ < E′n(f ). Then there are gambles g and h, andμ1, μ2 ∈ {0, 1}with at least one of them equal to 1 such
that Eq. (19) holds. Given ε > 0 it follows from the definition of Pn−1 P′n−1(·|B) that GPn−1(μ1g) + ε2 ∈ En−1 and similarly
B(μ2h − P′n−1(μ2h|B) + ε2 ) belongs to En−1 for every B ∈ B, or, equivalently, GP′n−1(μ2h|B) + ε2 belongs to EBn−1. But this
means that f − μ + ε belongs to En for every ε > 0, and as a consequence Pn(f ) ≥ μ. We conclude that Pn(f ) ≥ E′n(f ) and
therefore they are equal. 
On the other hand, P′n−1(·|B) satisfies (GBR) with respect to Pn−1: given a gamble f and a set B ∈ B, then for every ε > 0,
Pn−1(GP′n−1(f |B) + ε) ≥ Pn−1(B(f − P′n−1(f |B) + ε)) ≥ 0,
so Pn−1(GP′n−1(f |B)) ≥ −ε for every ε > 0, whence Pn−1(GP′n−1(f |B)) ≥ 0. And conversely, if there is some ε > 0
such that Pn−1(GP′n−1(f |B)) ≥ ε, then the gamble GP′n−1(f |B) − ε2 must belong to En−1, and therefore also the gamble
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B(f − P′n−1(f |B) − ε2 ), which is greater, belongs to En−1. But this means that we can increase the value P′n−1(f |B) by ε2 > 0,
a contradiction.
As a consequence, P′n−1(·|B) can strictly dominate the conditional natural extension Pn−1(·|B) of Pn−1 only when some
of the conditioning events have lower probability zero.
Using Proposition 18, we can now establish the following:
Proposition 20. Let R be a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles, and let P be its associated coherent lower prevision. Then
P1 = E1. As a consequence, if E1 is the conglomerable natural extension ofR, then E1 is the conglomerable natural extension of P.
Proof. By Proposition 18, it suffices to show that E1(f ) ≥ P1(f ) for every gamble f . Moreover, using the results from
Section 2.2,Rmust be the set of strictly desirable gambles associated to P, soR = L+ ∪ {f ∈ L : P(f ) > 0}.
Since P1 is the coherent lower prevision associated to E1, for every ε > 0, the gamble f − P1(f ) + ε belongs to E1, and
as a consequence there are gambles g and h such that g ∈ R and h ∈ RB , andμ1, μ2 ∈ {0, 1}with max{μ1, μ2} = 1 such
that f − P1(f ) + ε = μ1g + μ2h.
From the definition of P, g ∈ R implies that P(g) ≥ 0, whence g ≥ GP(g) and therefore μ1g ≥ GP(μ1g). On the other
hand, if h ∈ RB then Bh ∈ R∪{0} for every B ∈ B. If Bh = 0, then trivially P(h|B) ≥ 0. If Bh ∈ R, there are two possibilities:
if P(B) > 0 then Bh ∈ R implies that
0 ≤ sup {μ : B(h − μ) ∈ R} ≤ sup {μ : P(B(h − μ)) ≥ 0} = P(h|B),
where the last equality follows from (GBR). The second possibility is that P(B) = 0. Then Lemma 1 implies that
P(Bh) ≤ 0, so Bh can only belong to R if it is a non-negative gamble. Therefore P(h|B) = sup {μ : B(h − μ) ∈ R} =
sup {μ : B(h − μ)  0} = infω∈B h(ω).
From all this we deduce that the conditional lower prevision associated to R is the conditional natural extension P(·|B)
of P, and in this case that P(h|B) ≥ 0. This implies that h ≥ GP(h|B), and therefore μ2h ≥ GP(μ2h|B). As a consequence,
f − P1(f ) + ε ≥ GP(μ1g) + GP(μ2h|B). Hence E1(f ) ≥ P1(f ) − ε, and since this holds for all ε > 0, we find that
E1(f ) ≥ P1(f ).
For the second part, if E1 is the conglomerable natural extension of R, then it satisfies D5 and in particular wD5. We
deduce from Theorem 3 that the coherent lower prevision P1 = E1 satisfies wBC, i.e., that it is B-conglomerable. Since En
is a lower bound of the conglomerable natural extension for every n ∈ N, we find that in this case E1 is the conglomerable
natural extension. 
Wementionhowever that thenumberof stepsnecessary to compute the conglomerablenatural extension canbedifferent
in the two cases, as Example 6 shows.
As a consequence of Proposition 20, if E1 is not B-conglomerable, then E1 does not satisfy D5, provided we start from a
set of strictly desirable gambles. This observation allows us to give another example where the sequence of sets of desirable
gambles does not stabilise in the first step:
Example 7. Consider the coherent lower prevision P from Example 5 and let R be its associated set of strictly desirable
gambles. We have shown in Example 5 that the natural extension E of P and P(·|B) is not B-conglomerable, and therefore it
does not coincide with the conglomerable natural extension of P. Applying Proposition 20, we deduce that E1 cannot be the
conglomerable natural extension ofR, and therefore the sequence En does not stabilise at the first step.
We give another sufficient condition for the two sequences of coherent lower previsions to coincide:
Proposition 21. If P(B) > 0 for every B ∈ B, then Pn(f ) = En(f ) for all f ∈ L.
Proof. We use induction on n. We first give a proof for n = 1. From Proposition 19, P1 is the natural extension of P, P′(·|B),
whereP′(·|B) is derived fromRusingEq. (5). Sincewehaveproven thatP′(·|B) satisfies (GBR)with respect toP andP(B) > 0,
it follows that P′(·|B) = P(·|B), and as a consequence P1 coincides with the natural extension E1 of P and P(·|B).
Similarly, if the result holds for n−1, we know fromProposition 19 that Pn is the natural extension of Pn−1 and P′n−1(·|B),
where P′n−1(·|B) is derived from En−1 using Eq. (5). Since we have proved that P′n−1(·|B) satisfies (GBR) with respect to
Pn−1 = En−1 and Pn−1(B) ≥ P(B) > 0, it follows that P′n−1(·|B) = En−1(·|B). As a result, Pn coincides with the natural
extension En(f ) of En−1, En−1(·|B). 
Corollary 22. If P(B) > 0 for all B ∈ B and En is the conglomerable natural extension ofR, then En is the conglomerable natural
extension of P.
Proof. If En is the conglomerable natural extension of R then we have En = En+1, whence Pn = Pn+1, and, taking into
account Proposition 21, also En = En+1. Now, applying Proposition 16we deduce that En must be the conglomerable natural
extension of P. 
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The condition P(B) > 0 for every B ∈ B does not imply that the sequence stabilises at the first step, as Example 5 shows.
On the other hand, the sequences En and En need not stabilise at the same time, as we can deduce from the following:
Example 8. Take  := N, Bn := {2n, 2n − 1}, and let P be the countably additive probability defined by P({2n}) :=
P({2n − 1}) := 1
2n+1 . Consider the set of gambles
R := {f : P(f ) > 0} ∪ {f : P(f ) = 0, supp(f ) finite, and f (min supp(f )) > 0} ,
where supp(f ) := {n ∈ N : f (n) = 0}. SinceP is countablyadditiveonB, it isB-conglomerablebyWalley [21, Theorem6.9.1].
Applying Theorem 3, we deduce that R is weakly conglomerable. However, it is not conglomerable because the gamble
I{odd} − I{even} belongs toRB \ R.
To see that the conglomerable natural extension ofR exists, note that its superset
F ′ := {f : P(f ) > 0} ∪ {f : P(f ) = 0 and f (min supp(f )) > 0}
is coherent and conglomerable.
D1: L+ ⊆ {f : P(f ) > 0} ⊆ F ′.
D2: F ′ does not include the zero gamble by construction.
D3: Given a gamble f such that P(f ) > 0, it follows that P(λf ) > 0 for every λ > 0; and given f such that P(f ) = 0 and
f (min supp(f )) > 0, it holds that P(λf ) = 0 and λf (min supp(λf )) = λf (min supp(f )) > 0.
D4: Given f , g ∈ F ′, if either P(f ) > 0 or P(g) > 0, we deduce that P(f + g) > 0; if P(f ) = P(g) = 0, then
P(f + g) = 0 and, taking into account that f (min supp(f )) > 0 and g(min supp(g)) > 0, we deduce the equality
min supp(f + g) = min{min supp(f ),min supp(g)}. As a consequence, (f + g)(min supp(f + g)) > 0.
D5: Given f = 0 such that Bnf ∈ F ′ ∪ {0} for every Bn ∈ B, there are two possibilities: either there is some Bn such
that P(Bnf ) > 0, and the countable additivity of P implies that P(f ) > 0 and f ∈ F ′; or P(Bnf ) = 0 for every B,
whence P(f ) = 0. If we then consider the smallest n such that Bnf is non-zero, we must have that min supp(f ) =
min supp(Bnf ), and f (min supp(f )) = Bnf (min supp(Bnf )) > 0.
6. Conglomerability and coherence
In this section, we investigate in more detail the connections between the notions of conglomerability and coherence,
first for sets of desirable gambles and later for coherent lower previsions.
6.1. Conglomerability and coherence for sets of desirable gambles
Let R be a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles, and let RB be the set we can associate with it by means of D5. By
Proposition 9,RB satisfies D1– D5, andmoreoverR is conglomerable whenRB ⊆ R. The connection between this property
and the coherence ofR ∪ RB is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 23. LetR be a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles. Then each of the following statements implies the next:
(i) R = RB .
(ii) R is conglomerable.
(iii) E1 is the conglomerable natural extension ofR.
(iv) R ∪ RB is included in a coherent set.
Proof. That the first statement implies the second is trivial. The second implies the third because ifR is conglomerable then
RB ⊆ R and therefore E1 = R. Finally, if E1 is the conglomerable natural extension ofR then it is in a particular a coherent
superset ofR ∪ RB . 
Remark 2. None of the converse implications hold in general. Example 1 gives a conglomerable set of strictly desirable
gambles that is different from L+ (note for instance that it includes the gamble 1 − I{1}) and which, from Proposition 10,
differs fromRB . Example 7 gives an instance where the conglomerable natural extension ofR exists (and thereforeR∪RB
is included in a coherent set) but it is different from E1. In Example 9, we exhibit a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles
that is not conglomerable but whose conglomerable natural extension is given by E1.
Example 9. Let  := N ∪ −N, Bn := {−n, n} and let B be the partition of  given by B := {Bn : n ∈ N}. Consider the
previsions P1, P2 defined in Example 5, and let P := min{P1, P2}. It follows from arguments similar to the ones on that
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example that P(Bn) > 0 for all n ∈ N, that
P(f |Bn) = min
{
f (n),
f (n) + f (−n)
2
}
,
and that P is not B-conglomerable.
The set R of strictly desirable gambles associated to P is included in the set {f : P1(f ) > 0}, whence also RB ⊆{f : P1(f ) > 0} (because P1 is B-conglomerable) and as a consequence E1 ⊆ {f : P1(f ) > 0}. To show the converse in-
clusion, it suffices to show that P1 is the natural extension of P and P(·|B): since P(Bn) > 0 for all n ∈ N, it follows from
Proposition 21 that E1 induces the linear prevision P1, and as a consequence it includes its set of strictly desirable gambles.
To determine the natural extension E of P and P(·|B), we apply Proposition 13. First of all, for every linear prevision
Q ∈ M(P), there is some α ∈ [0, 1] such that Q = αP1 + (1− α)P2. We are going to check that for all α = 1 there is some
gamble h such that Q(h) < P(P(h|B)), which will mean that Q /∈ M(E). Fix δ > 0 and let h be given by h(n) := 1 − 1
n
+ δ
and h(−n) := −1 + 1
n
. Then P(h|Bn) = δ/2 > 0 for all n ∈ N implies that P(P(h|B)) = δ/2 > 0, while
Q(h) = αP1(h) + (1 − α)P2(h) = α δ
2
+ (1 − α)1
2
⎡
⎣∑
n∈N
1
2n
(1 + δ − 1
n
) − 1
⎤
⎦ < 0
for δ small enough. Hence E = P1 and therefore E1 = {f : P1(f ) > 0}, which is conglomerable.
Interestingly, it was proven in Zaffalon and Miranda [24] that, given a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles R, the
set R ∪ RB is coherent if and only if R is conglomerable. Moreover, the coherence of R ∪ RB can be given a behavioural
interpretation as the impossibility of making a Dutch book against us by combining our current beliefs, modelled byR, and
the conditional beliefsRB , which only become effective after the observation of some element of the partition B (this notion
is called temporal coherence in Zaffalon and Miranda [24]). Theorem 23 shows that temporal coherence is an intermediate
notion between the equalityR = RB (which, from Proposition 10 only holdswhenR = L+) and the conglomerable natural
extension being attained in one step. On the other hand, when R is not a set of strictly desirable gambles, it is proven in
Zaffalon and Miranda [24] that the coherence of R ∪ RB is an intermediate notion between the conglomerability and the
weak conglomerability ofR.
6.2. Conglomerability and coherence of conditional lower previsions
A particular case where the conglomerable natural extension of a set of gambles always exists is when we consider the
set of gambles induced by a separately coherent conditional lower prevision P(·|B). For every B ∈ B, let
RB := {f ∈ L(B) : P(f |B) > 0 or f  0}
be the coherent set of strictly desirable gambles on B associated to P(·|B), and denote by
R|B := {f ∈ L() : f = Bf , f |B ∈ RB}
its extension to , where f |B represents the restriction of f to B. Finally, let posi(L+⋃B∈B R|B) be the natural extension
of
⋃
B∈B R|B. To see that this set is coherent, note that by definition R|B does not include any gamble f ≤ 0, and as a
consequence neither does posi(
⋃
B∈B R|B); this implies that posi(L+ ∪ ⋃B∈B R|B) does not include the zero gamble, and
as a consequence it is coherent by Miranda and Zaffalon [14, Proposition 3(d)].
Since for any gamble f in this natural extension and any B ∈ B it follows that Bf ∈ posi(L+ ∪⋃B∈B R|B) ∪ {0}, we can
apply Proposition 9 to deduce that the conglomerable natural extension of this set is given by
F := {0 = f ∈ L : (∀B ∈ B)Bf ∈ R|B ∪ {0}} . (20)
Then we can establish the following result:
Proposition 24. Let P and P(·|B) be a coherent lower prevision and a separately coherent conditional lower prevision on L, and
letR andR|B (B ∈ B) be the respective sets of strictly desirable gambles they induce, and F be given by Eq. (20). Then
P and P(·|B) coherent ⇒ R ∪ F coherent. (21)
Moreover, if P and P(·|B) are coherent thenR is conglomerable andRB ⊆ F .
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Proof. Assume ex absurdo that R ∪ F is not coherent. Then there are gambles f ∈ R and g ∈ F such that f + g /∈ R,
whence P(f + g) ≤ 0. We can assumewithout loss of generality that neither of these gambles is non-negative, or we would
contradict the coherence of eitherR or F . SinceR is a set of strictly desirable gambles, f ∈ R implies that P(f ) > 0. On the
other hand, g ∈ F implies that P(g|B) ≥ 0, so g ≥ G(g|B). As a consequence,
0 ≥ P(f + g) ≥ P(f ) + P(g) ⇒ 0 > −P(f ) ≥ P(g) ≥ P(G(g|B)),
and this contradicts that P, P(·|B) are coherent.
For the second part, apply Walley [21, Theorem 6.8.2(a)] to deduce that P is conglomerable and Theorem 3 to conclude
that so isR.
On the other hand, if P and P(·|B) are coherent, then fromWalley [21, Theorem 6.8.2(a)] we infer that P(·|B) dominates
the conditional natural extension E(·|B) of P, given by Eq. (11). For every B ∈ B, Zaffalon andMiranda [24, Lemma 1] implies
that
RB = {f ∈ L : f = Bf ∈ R} = {f ∈ L : f = Bf and [Bf  0 or E(f |B) > 0]} ,
and since E(f |B) ≤ P(f |B) for every gamble f , we deduce thatRB ⊆ R|B. As a consequence,RB ⊆ F . 
The converse to Eq. (21) does not hold:
Example 10. Consider  := {1, 2, 3, 4}, B := {1, 2} and B := {B, Bc}. Let P be the vacuous lower prevision P on L and
P(·|B) the linear conditional prevision given by
P(f |B) := f (1) + f (2)
2
and P(f |Bc) := f (3) + f (4)
2
.
LetR be the set of strictly desirable gambles associated to P, andR|B,R|Bc be the sets of gambles on associated to P(·|B).
ThenR = L+ and
R|B = {f ∈ L() : f = Bf and f (1) + f (2) > 0} ,
R|Bc = {f ∈ L() : f = Bcf and f (3) + f (4) > 0} .
Let F be given by Eq. (20).R∪F is coherent becauseR ⊆ F . To see that P and P(·|B) are not coherent, consider the gamble
f := (1,−1, 1,−1). Then P(f |B) = 0, whence f − P(f |B) = f and P(G(f |B)) = P(f ) = −1 < 0.
In Theorem 3, we have shown that the conglomerability of a set of strictly desirable gamblesR is equivalent to that of the
coherent lower prevision P it induces, which in turn is equivalent to it being coherent with its conditional natural extension
E(·|B). More generally, if we consider a conditional lower prevision P(·|B) that is coherent with P and differs from E(·|B),
we may wonder if there is some coherent and conglomerable set of gambles from which we can induce both P and P(·|B)
by means of Eqs. (3) and (5), respectively. The following theorem answers this question, while also distinguishing the cases
related to Walley’s and Williams’s notions of coherence for lower previsions:
Theorem 25. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on L and P(·|B) a separately coherent conditional lower prevision on L. LetR
be the set of strictly desirable gambles induced by P, and R|B (B ∈ B) the sets of gambles associated to P(·|B); let F be given by
Eq. (20).
(i) P and P(·|B) are coherent if and only if they can be induced by a conglomerable coherent set. In that case, one such set is
R ∪ F .
(ii) P and P(·|B) are Williams coherent if and only if they can be induced by a coherent set. In that case, one such set is
R ∪ posi(L+ ∪⋃B∈B R|B).
Proof. We begin with the first statement.
First of all, if P and P(·|B) are coherent, then we know from Proposition 24 that R ∪ F is coherent. To see that it is
conglomerable, consider a non-zero gamble f such that Bf ∈ R ∪ F ∪ {0} for all B. Then
f = ∑
B∈B : Bf∈R
Bf + ∑
B∈B : Bf /∈R
Bf =: f1 + f2.
The coherence of P and P(·|B) implies thatR is conglomerable, and as a consequence the gamble f1 belongs toR ∪ {0}. On
the other hand, f2 ∈ F ∪ {0} because this set F is conglomerable by definition. As a consequence, f ∈ posi(R∪ F ∪ {0}) =
posi(R∪F)∪{0} = R∪F∪{0}, taking into account thatR∪F is coherent, by Proposition24.Hence, it is also conglomerable.
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Let Q be the coherent lower prevision induced byR ∪ F . Trivially Q ≥ P. Assume ex absurdo that there is some gamble
f such that Q(f ) > P(f ), then there is some ε > 0 such that the gamble g := f − P(f ) − ε belongs to R ∪ F . Since it
cannot belong toR because this is the set of strictly desirable gambles associated with P and P(f − P(f ) − ε) = −ε < 0, it
must belong to F . Hence, for all B ∈ B either Bg ≥ 0 or P(g|B) > 0. We deduce that P(g|B) ≥ 0, whence g ≥ G(g|B) and
therefore 0 > P(g) ≥ P(G(g|B)). This contradicts the coherence of P and P(·|B). Hence Q = P.
Similarly, let Q(·|B) be the conditional lower prevision associated with R ∪ F . Trivially Q(·|B) ≥ P(·|B). Assume ex
absurdo that there is some gamble f and some B ∈ B such that Q(f |B) > P(f |B). Then there is some ε > 0 such that
B(f − P(f |B) − ε) ∈ R, and since B(f − P(f |B) − ε) cannot be non-negative or it would belong to F , we deduce that
P(B(f − P(f |B)− ε)) > 0. As a consequence, P(B(f − P(f |B))) ≥ P(B(f − P(f |B)− ε)) > 0, and this contradicts that P and
P(·|B) satisfy (GBR).
Conversely, letG bea coherent and conglomerable set, and letP andP(·|B)be the respectiveunconditional and conditional
lower previsions associated with it. Consider any gamble f and any B ∈ B. Then for every ε > 0 the gamble G(f |B) + εB
belongs to G, whence P(G(f |B) + εB) ≥ 0 for all ε > 0 and therefore P(G(f |B)) ≥ 0, because the set of almost-desirable
gambles associated to a coherent lower prevision is closed under uniform convergence. Now, if P(G(f |B)) > 0 then there is
some δ > 0 such that
0 < P(G(f |B) − δ) ≤ P(G(f |B) − δB),
whence G(f |B) − δB ∈ G and therefore we can raise the value P(f |B) by δ, a contradiction.
On the other hand, if G(f |B)+ εB belongs to G for every B ∈ B, the conglomerability of G implies that G(f |B)+ ε ∈ G and
therefore P(G(f |B) + ε) ≥ 0. Since this holds for every ε > 0, we deduce that P(G(f |B)) ≥ 0 and therefore P and P(·|B)
are coherent.
Next, we turn to the second statement.
Assume that P and P(·|B) are Williams coherent, and let us consider the set G := R ∪ posi(L+ ∪⋃B∈B R|B). We show
that G is coherent. Since bothR and posi(L+ ∪⋃B∈B R|B) are coherent, it suffices to check that f + g ∈ G for every f ∈ R
and g ∈ posi(L+ ∪⋃B∈B R|B). Since P and P(·|B) areWilliams coherent, we know that for every gamble f and every B ∈ B,
P(G(f |B)) = 0. Applying the super-additivity of P, we deduce that
P(g) ≥ ∑
B∈B : Bg∈R|B
P(Bg) ≥ ∑
B∈B : Bg∈R|B
P(B(g − P(g|B))) = ∑
B∈B : Bg∈R|B
P(GP(g|B)) ≥ 0
for every g ∈ posi(L+ ∪⋃B∈B R|B). To see that the first sum is finite, note that by definition of the posi operator the gamble
g is a finite sum of gambles in L+ ∪⋃B∈B R|B, because each of the sets in this union is a convex cone.
As a consequence, given that f ∈ R and g ∈ posi(L+ ∪ ⋃B∈B R|B), there are two possibilities: either f ∈ L+, whence
f + g ∈ posi(L+ ∪⋃B∈B R|B), or P(f ) > 0, and then P(f + g) ≥ P(f ) + P(g) > 0, and therefore f + g ∈ R.
Now, let Q be the unconditional lower prevision induced by G. Trivially, Q ≥ P. Assume ex absurdo that there is some
gamble f such that Q(f ) > P(f ), then there is some ε > 0 such that the gamble g := f − P(f ) − ε belongs to G, so there
are gambles h1 ∈ R and h2 ∈ posi(L+ ∪⋃B∈B R|B) such that g = h1 + h2. As a consequence,
−ε = P(g) = P(h1 + h2) ≥ P(h1) + P(h2) ≥ P(h2) ≥ 0,
a contradiction. Hence Q = P.
Similarly, letQ(·|B) be the conditional lower prevision induced by G. Trivially,Q(·|B) ≥ P(·|B). Assume ex absurdo there
is some gamble f and some B ∈ B such thatQ(f |B) > P(f |B). Then there is some ε > 0 such that g := B(f −P(f |B)−ε) ∈ G.
If it belongs to posi(L+ ∪ ⋃B∈B R|B), then there must be some gamble h and some δ > 0 such that g ≥ G(h|B) + Bδ,
whence G(h|B)−G(f |B) ≤ B(−ε − δ), contradicting the separate coherence of P(·|B). If instead it belongs toR, then either
(i) g  0, which contradicts the definition of P(·|B); or (ii) P(g) > 0, whence P(G(f |B)) ≥ P(g) > 0, also a contradiction,
in this case with (GBR).
The converse proof follows the same lines as that of the first statement. 
7. Conglomerability for a number of partitions
To conclude the technical discussion, we turn to conglomerability with respect to a number of partitions, rather than just
one. Consider a non-empty set B of partitions of . This set need not be finite, although we will make this assumption in
much of what follows.
We call a set of desirable gambles (weakly)B-conglomerable if it is (weakly) conglomerable with respect to all partitions
B inB.We denote byDC(B) the set of all coherent sets of desirable gambles on that satisfy D5with respect to all partitions
in B, and similarly, by DwC(B) the set of all coherent sets of desirable gambles on  that satisfy wD5 with respect to all
partitions in B.
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Clearly, like its counterpart for a single partition, (weak) B-conglomerability is preserved under taking arbitrary inter-
sections. This implies that if a set of desirable gambles is dominated by some coherent andB-conglomerable set of desirable
gambles, then there is a smallest such dominating set.
Definition 5. Consider a non-empty setB of partitions of. If it exists, the (weakly)B-conglomerable natural extension of a
setR of desirable gambles on , is its smallest coherent superset that is (weakly) conglomerable with respect to all B in B.
Proposition 26. If there is some coherent superset of R that satisfies condition D5 (respectively wD5) with respect to B, then
the smallest such superset is given by
F := ⋂ {D ∈ DC(B) : R ⊆ D} respectively F := ⋂ {D ∈ DwC(B) : R ⊆ D} .
From now on, wewill concentrate on the casewhereB = {B1, . . . , Bm} is a finite set of partitions of. But we first show
that conglomerability with respect to each of the partitions B1, . . . , Bm is equivalent to conglomerability with respect to all
the partitions that can be derived from them—we may refer to this notion as cross-conglomerability. Let us define
B′ := {B partition : (∀B ∈ B)(∃j ∈ {1, . . . ,m})B ∈ Bj} . (22)
It should be remarked that, while B is finite, B′ can be infinite.
Proposition 27. LetR be a coherent set of desirable gambles.
(i) If R satisfies D5 with respect to any partition Bj in B, then it also satisfies D5 with respect to any partition B in B′:
DC(B) = DC(B′).
(ii) If R satisfies wD5 with respect to any partition Bj in B, then it also satisfies wD5 with respect to any partition B in B′:
DwC(B) = DwC(B′).
Proof. Let us begin with the first statement. Consider a partition B inB′, and let f be any gamble such that Bf ∈ R∪ {0} for
all B ∈ B. Define the collections of sets
Aj :=
⎧⎨
⎩B ∈ B : B ∈ Bj
∖j−1⋃
i=1
Ai
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
for which
⋃m
j=1 Aj = B, and the collection
A := {Aj : j = 1, . . . ,m and Bjf = 0 for some Bj ∈ Aj} .
As a consequence,
f = ∑
Aj∈A
∑
Bj∈Aj
Bjf ∈ R,
taking into account that for every j thegamble
∑
Bj∈Aj Bjf ∈ R∪{0}becauseR satisfiesD5with respect toBj , andapplyingD4.
The second statement follows by applying the first to sets of strictly desirable gambles. 
7.1. The marginal extension theorem
We now consider, for i = 1, . . . ,m, a coherent set of desirable gambles Ri that is Bi-conglomerable, and we want to
determine the B-conglomerable natural extension F of⋃mi=1 Ri, if it exists. Similarly to what happened in Section 3, when
the conglomerable natural extension F exists, we can approximate it by means of a sequence of sets of desirable gambles.
For the purposes of this section, it will suffice to consider the first element of this sequence. For everyRi, consider, as before,
the set
RBi := {0 = f ∈ L : (∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m})Bif ∈ Ri ∪ {0}} ,
and let
D1 := posi
⎛
⎝ m⋃
i=1
(Ri ∪ RBi )
⎞
⎠ .
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When this set is coherent, it can be written equivalently as
D1 = L ∩
⎧⎨
⎩
m∑
i=1
(fi + gi) : fi ∈ Ri ∪ {0} and (∀Bi ∈ Bi)Bigi ∈ Ri ∪ {0}
⎫⎬
⎭
∖
{0}. (23)
We will now prove that when the partitions are nested the sequence stabilises after one step: in this case D1 coincides
withF . This is a generalised version of themarginal extension theorem, whichwas originally established for coherent lower
previsions and a single partition inWalley [21, Theorem 6.7.2], and later extended to a finite number of partitions in [12]. In
a different context, using different notations, a more general result than ours was also established (in a different manner)
by De Cooman and Hermans [2, Theorem 3].
In order to do this, we need to introduce the notion of a coherent set of desirable gambles relative to another subset:
Definition 6. Let Q be a linear space of gambles containing constant gambles, and let R ⊆ Q. We say that R is coherent
relative to Q if it satisfies axioms D2–D4 and
D1’ . Q ∩ L+ ⊆ R.
Note that when Q = L, this becomes the usual coherence notion characterised by axioms D1–D4.
We shall also have recourse to the following simple lemma:
Lemma 28. LetR be a set of gambles coherent relative to Q. Then for every gamble f ≤ 0, f /∈ R.
Proof. That 0 /∈ R follows from D2. Assume ex absurdo that 0  f ∈ R. Then f ∈ Q, and since this is a linear space also
−f ∈ Q, whence 0  −f ∈ R by D1’. We deduce, applying D4 that 0 = f − f also belongs toR. This is a contradiction. 
Webegin by establishing our result for the least involved special case: one partition only.We consider a partition B, and a
setR0 that only contains B-measurable gambles, meaning that they are constant on the elements of B. We assume that the
set of desirable gamblesR is coherent relative to the set of B-measurable gambles. It is trivially conglomerable with respect
to the partition B0 = {}.
For each B ∈ B, we also consider a coherent set of desirable gamblesRB on L(B). We can use these sets to construct the
set of desirable gambles
R1 := L ∩
⎛
⎝∑
B∈B
B(RB ∪ {0})
⎞
⎠∖ {0} = L ∩
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
B∈B
BgB : gB ∈ RB ∪ {0}
⎫⎬
⎭
∖
{0}.
This coherent set of desirable gambles is theB-conglomerable natural extension of the set of gambles⋃B∈B {BgB : gB ∈ RB}.
Note that the gamble BgB is a gamble on that is equal to gB on B, and zero elsewhere. This is done to ensure all the gambles
we will combine later on are defined on the same domain.
We are now looking for the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles that includesR0 ∪R1 and that is conglomerable
with respect to B0 and B. The following proposition solves this problem in slightly reformulated wording.
Proposition 29. LetR0 be a set of B-measurable desirable gambles that is coherent relative to the set of B-measurable gambles.
For each B ∈ B, letRB be a coherent set of desirable gambles on B. Then the B-conglomerable natural extension of the set
R0 ∪ {BgB : gB ∈ RB and B ∈ B}
is given by
F := L ∩
⎧⎨
⎩f +
∑
B∈B
BgB : f ∈ R0 ∪ {0} and gB ∈ RB ∪ {0}
⎫⎬
⎭
∖
{0}.
Proof. Let us show that F satisfies D1–D5.
D1: Consider h ∈ L+. Write it as h = ∑B∈B:Bh =0 Bh = ∑B∈B:Bh =0 Bh|B, where the gamble h|B ∈ L(B) is the restriction of
h to the set B, defined by h|B(ω) := h(ω) for all ω ∈ B. Since h|B ∈ L+(B), it belongs to the coherent set of desirable
gamblesRB. Therefore h belongs to F .
D2: We know that 0 /∈ F by definition.
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D3: Consider h ∈ F and λ > 0. We know that there are f ∈ R0 and gB ∈ RB∪ {0} such that λf = λf +∑B∈B BλgB. But
since the set of B-measurable gambles is a linear space containing constant gambles, andR0 is coherent relative to it,
λf ∈ R0 ∪ {0}. Similarly, λgB ∈ RB ∪ {0}, sinceRB is coherent. It follows that λh ∈ F , because λf = 0.
D4: Consider h, h′ ∈ F . Then h + h′ = f + f ′ +∑B∈B B(gB + g′B), where f , f ′ ∈ R0 ∪ {0} and gB, g′B ∈ RB ∪ {0}. For
reasons analogous to the ones given above, f + f ′ ∈ R0 ∪ {0} and gB + g′B ∈ RB ∪ {0}. From this, we obtain that
h + h′ ∈ F ∪ {0}. Assume ex absurdo that h + h′ = 0; then either 0 = f + f ′ or f + f ′ = 0. In the first case, the
coherence ofR0 implies that f = f ′ = 0, and similarly since gB +g′B = 0 for every Bwe should have that gB = g′B = 0
for all B. But then h = h′ = 0, a contradiction.
In the second case, 0 = f + f ′ = −∑B∈B B(gB + g′B), and taking into account that f + f ′ is B-measurable, there
must be some B ∈ B such that B(f + f ′)  0; otherwise it would follow that f + f ′ ≤ 0, which is impossible because
of Lemma 28. But for this B we obtain that gB + g′B  0, which is again impossible because of Lemma 28. This is a
contradiction.
D5: Consider h ∈ L such that Bh ∈ F∪{0} for all B ∈ B. Fix any B such that Bh = 0, then Bh = f +∑B∈B BgB. If f = 0, then
Bh = BgB. If f = 0, then we consider any B′ ∈ B \ {B}. Bh is zero on B′, and therefore B′f + B′gB′ = 0. Recalling that f
is B-measurable and therefore assumes the constant value f (B′) on B′, this can only happen if f (B′) < 0: otherwise,
RB′ would contradict Lemma 28. Since we can repeat this reasoning for all B′ = B, we deduce that f must assume a
constant value f (B) > 0 on B, since otherwise R0 would contradict Lemma 28. Then gB + f (B) ∈ RB, so that if we
let g′B := gB + f (B), we obtain that Bh = Bg′B. As a consequence, h =
∑
B∈B:Bh =0 Bh = ∑B∈B:Bh =0 Bg′B ∈ F .
Since on the other hand F is included in the set D1 given by Eq. (23) which is in turn included in the conglomerable
natural extension, we deduce that F is the conglomerable natural extension ofR0 ∪ {BgB : gB ∈ RB and B ∈ B}. 
Let us extend this result to a finite number of partitions. We considerm partitions B1, . . . , Bm of  that are successively
finer: Bi+1 is finer than Bi for i = 1, . . . ,m − 1.R0 is a set of B1-measurable desirable gambles that is coherent relative to
the set of all B1-measurable gambles. For each i = 1, . . . ,m − 1 and each Bi ∈ Bi, we consider the partition
Bi+1Bi := {Bi+1 ∈ Bi+1 : Bi+1 ⊆ Bi}
of Bi, and a set RiBi of Bi+1Bi-measurable desirable gambles on Bi that is coherent relative to the set of all Bi+1Bi-
measurable gambles. Finally, for each Bm ∈ Bm, we consider a coherent setRmBm of desirable gambles on Bm.
We can use the setsRiBi, Bi ∈ Bi to construct the set of desirable gambles
Ri := L ∩
⎛
⎝∑
Bi∈Bi
Bi(RiBi ∪ {0})
⎞
⎠∖ {0} = L ∩
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
Bi∈Bi
BigBi : gBi ∈ RiBi ∪ {0}
⎫⎬
⎭
∖
{0}.
This coherent set of desirable gambles is the Bi-conglomerable natural extension of the set of gambles⋃
Bi∈Bi
{
BigBi : gBi ∈ RiBi
}
.
Wearenowlooking for thesmallest coherent setofdesirablegambles that includesR0∪⋃mi=1 Ri andthat is conglomerable
with respect to B0, B1, . . . , Bm.
Proposition 30. Let B1, . . . , Bm be partitions of  such that Bi+1 is finer than Bi for i = 1, . . . ,m − 1. Let R0 be a set of
B1-measurable desirable gambles that is coherent relative to the set of all B1-measurable gambles. For each i = 1, . . . ,m − 1
and each Bi ∈ Bi, let RiBi be a set of Bi+1Bi-measurable desirable gambles on Bi that is coherent relative to the class of all
Bi+1Bi-measurable gambles, For each Bm ∈ Bm, letRmBm be a coherent set of desirable gambles on Bm. Then the conglomerable
natural extension of
R0 ∪
m⋃
i=1
⋃
Bi∈Bi
{
BigBi : gBi ∈ RiBi
}
is given by
Fm := L ∩
⎧⎨
⎩f0 +
m∑
i=1
∑
Bi∈Bi
BigBi : f0 ∈ R0 ∪ {0} and gBi ∈ RiBi ∪ {0}
⎫⎬
⎭
∖
{0}.
Proof. To make the notation more uniform, we introduce the trivial partition B0 := {}, and define B0 := ,R0B0 := R0
and gB0 := f0.
We use induction on the number of partitions m. For m = 1, the result has already been established in Proposition 29.
Assume therefore that the result holds form − 1, and let us prove that it also holds form.
If we can prove that Fm satisfies D1–D5, then it is the conglomerable natural extension, because any superset of R0 ∪⋃m
i=1
⋃
Bi∈Bi
{
BigBi : gBi ∈ RiBi
}
that satisfiesD1–D5necessarily includesFm. Let us therefore show thatFm satisfiesD1–D5.
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D1: Consider any h ∈ L+. Write it as
h = ∑
Bm∈Bm : Bmh =0
Bmh =
∑
Bm∈Bm : Bmh =0
BmgBm ,
where the gambles gBm ∈ L(Bm) are defined by gBm(ω) := h(ω) for all ω ∈ Bm and all Bm such that Bmh = 0. Since
then gBm ∈ L+(Bm), it belongs toRmBm, which is a coherent set of desirable gambles. This implies that h ∈ Fm.
D2: We know that 0 /∈ Fm by definition.
D3: Consider h ∈ Fm and λ > 0. We know that λh = ∑mi=0∑Bi∈Bi BiλgBi . Since for i = 0, . . . ,m − 1 the set of Bi+1Bi-
measurable gambles is a linear space containing all constant gambles, and since RiBi is coherent relative to it, we
know that λgBi ∈ RiBi ∪ {0}. Moreover, λgBm ∈ RmBm ∪ {0}, asRmBm is coherent. Hence λh ∈ Fm.
D4: Consider h, h′ ∈ Fm. Then h+ h′ = ∑mi=0∑Bi∈Bi Bi(gBi + g′Bi), where gBi , g′Bi ∈ RiBi ∪ {0}. For reasons analogous to
those mentioned above, gBi + g′Bi ∈ RiBi ∪ {0}. Hence h + h′ ∈ Fm ∪ {0}. Assume ex absurdo that h + h′ = 0, then
f :=
m−1∑
i=0
∑
Bi∈Bi
Bi
(
gBi + g′Bi
)
= − ∑
Bm∈Bm
Bm
(
gBm + g′Bm
)
.
The gamble f belongs to the set Fm−1 we would obtain by considering the sets R0, RjBj for j = 1, . . . ,m − 2,
andR′m−1Bm−1, whereR′m−1Bm−1 is the natural extension ofRm−1Bm−1. Applying the induction hypothesis, we
deduce that f = 0. Since moreover, f is Bm-measurable, there must be some Bm ∈ Bm such that Bmf ∈ L+, otherwise
f ≤ 0 and f ∈ Fm−1, which is coherent by the induction hypothesis, would contradict Lemma 28. But for this Bm we
obtain that gBm + g′Bm  0, soRmBm violates Lemma 28. This is a contradiction.
D5: Consider h ∈ L such that Bih ∈ Fm ∪ {0} for all Bi ∈ Bi and all i = 1, . . . ,m. We fix our attention for the time being
on any one Bi for which Bih = 0, and have by definition that Bih = ∑mj=0∑Bj∈Bj BjgBj . Let
f :=
i−1∑
j=0
∑
Bj∈Bj
BjgBj and g :=
m∑
j=i
∑
Bj∈Bj
BjgBj .
If f = 0, then we can express
Bih = Big =
m∑
j=i
∑
Bj∈Bj,Bj⊆Bi
BjgBj .
If f = 0, look at anyB′i ∈ Bi such thatB′i = Bi.Bih is zero onB′i , andhenceB′i f+B′ig = 0.Now, recalling that f isBi-measurable,
the constant value f (B′i) that f assumes on B′i must be negative: f (B′i) < 0. Otherwise, wewould have that 0 ≥ B′ig ∈ Fm, and
this contradicts Lemma 28. Since we can repeat this reasoning for all B′i = Bi, we deduce that the constant value f (Bi) that f
assumes on Bi must be positive: f (Bi) > 0. Otherwise Fm would again contradict Lemma 28. But then gBi + f (Bi) ∈ RiBi,
so that if we redefine gBi := gBi + f (Bi), we obtain that
Bih =
m∑
j=i
∑
Bj∈Bj,Bj⊆Bi
BjgBj .
As a consequence,
h = ∑
Bi∈Bi : Bih =0
Bih =
∑
Bi∈Bi : Bih =0
m∑
j=i
∑
Bj∈Bj,Bj⊆Bi
BjgBj =
m∑
j=i
∑
Bi∈Bi : Bih =0
∑
Bj∈Bj,Bj⊆Bi
BjgBj
and therefore h ∈ Fm. 
7.2. Conglomerability and weak coherence
Finally, we turn to the notion of conglomerability for coherent lower previsions, this timewith respect to a finite number
of partitions. It is easy to relate this property to the notion of weak coherence:
Proposition 31. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on L, and let B1, . . . , Bm be partitions of . The following statements are
equivalent:
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(i) P is Bi-conglomerable for i = 1, . . . ,m.
(ii) P is B-conglomerable for any partition B in the class B′ defined by (22).
(iii) There are conditional lower previsions P1(·|B1), . . . , Pm(·|Bm) weakly coherent with P.
Proof. First of all, P is Bi-conglomerable if and only if it is coherent with its conditional natural extension Pi(·|Bi). As a
consequence, it is Bi-conglomerable for i = 1, . . . ,m if and only if it is pairwise coherent with the conditional lower
previsions P1(·|B1), . . . , Pm(·|Bm). Applying [13, Theorem 1], this is equivalent to P, P1(·|B1), . . . , Pm(·|Bm) being weakly
coherent. Hence, the first and third statements are equivalent.
To see that the first two statements are equivalent, note that, from Theorem 3, P is Bi-conglomerable for i = 1, . . . ,m if
and only if its associated set of strictly desirable gamblesR is Bi-conglomerable for i = 1, . . . ,m. Applying Proposition 27,
this holds if and only ifR satisfies D5 with respect to any partition B ∈ B′, and using Theorem 3 again, this is equivalent to
P being B-conglomerable for any partition B in the class B′. 
8. Conclusions
Some authors, amongst whom Peter Walley, have argued in favour of imposing conglomerability on uncertainty models,
such as sets of desirable gambles, coherent lower previsions, or precise probabilities. We have studied the problem of
extending a given uncertainty model into the weakest conglomerable model that logically follows from it: we have called
this the conglomerable natural extension.
An intuitively natural approach to addressing the problem of constructing this conglomerable natural extension consists
in imposing conglomerability on the model, and then taking the natural extension. In fact, this is the approach taken in
Walley’s theory. Unfortunately, our main finding in this paper shows that such an approach does not yield the conglomer-
able natural extension in general, even though it does so in the case of the marginal extension theorem. This has important
implications for Walley’s theory: it means that it does not fully take into account the implications of conglomerability. We
have also shown that iterating the above-mentioned intuitive process yields models closer and closer to the conglomerable
natural extension. The questionwhether the conglomerable natural extension is achieved in the limit, remains unanswered,
however.
All this means that the foundations of Walley’s theory of coherent lower previsions have to be reconsidered in the case
where there are infinitely many events in the conditioning partition of the possibility space. Our results indicate that it
may be necessary to modify his definition of natural extension of a conditional and an unconditional model (be it a set of
desirable gambles or a coherent lower prevision) to make it truly and fully compatible with the notion of conglomerability.
Related to this, it would be important to investigate possible modifications of his definition for the coherence of conditional
and unconditional lower previsions, and whether these modifications allow us to obtain envelope theorems, thus also al-
lowing a sensitivity analysis interpretation for coherence in the conditional case. In fact, on Walley’s approach, the useful
equivalence between coherent lower previsions and sets of probabilities breaks down in the conditional case for infinite
possibility spaces. As a consequence of the results in this paper, it is no longer clear whether this is unavoidable (as seems
to have been assumed before), or if it is merely due to the arguably inadequate treatment of conglomerability in Walley’s
theory.
More work should also be done to study the general case of multiple partitions that are not necessarily nested. Finally,
in our definition of coherence for sets of desirable gambles we are assuming that the zero gamble is not desirable. This is in
line with more recent work on desirability [3,14]. Although we have not detailed it here, it is possible to show that our main
finding, that the conglomerable natural extension is not attained after applying once coherence and conglomerability, still
holds in the alternative approach where the zero gamble is desirable.
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